Macro Musings
Macro Musings

136 – Josh Galper on LIBOR, Overnight Lending, and the Lehman Brothers Collapse

Josh Galper is the managing principal of Finadium, an independent consultancy in capital markets with unique expertise in securities, finance, collateral, and derivatives. He joins the show today to talk about money markets, overnight interest rates, and some of the big issues in this area. David an

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David Beckworth HostJosh Galper Guest

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Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Josh Galper explains the plumbing behind monetary policy: why Lehman’s failure was a pivotal catalyst for the financial crisis, how repo markets work, and why LIBOR is being replaced by SOFR. He argues secured, transaction-based benchmarks are more reliable than unsecured estimates, but notes the transition from LIBOR will be messy, with major implications for derivatives, mortgages, and Fed policy.

Main Topics: Lehman’s Collapse and the 2008 Crisis (Priority: 5/5): Galper argues Lehman’s failure was not inevitable and that the loss of confidence in repo funding triggered a destructive run through money markets and securities lending cash pools. LIBOR’s Scandal and Decline (Priority: 5/5): The conversation explains how LIBOR became vulnerable to manipulation, why it is considered less reliable, and why global markets are moving away from it. SOFR as a Replacement Benchmark (Priority: 5/5): SOFR is presented as a more robust overnight benchmark because it is based on actual secured repo transactions backed by U.S. Treasuries rather than hypothetical bank submissions. Repo Markets and Market Structure (Priority: 4/5): Galper breaks down tri-party repo, bilateral repo, and dealer-to-dealer cleared repo, emphasizing that different repo segments produce different rates and influence SOFR. Fed Funds, IOER, and Monetary Policy Plumbing (Priority: 4/5): The discussion examines the hollowing out of the federal funds market, the role of interest on excess reserves, and how the Fed’s operating framework has shifted after 2008. Narrow Bank / TNB and Fed Balance Sheet Access (Priority: 3/5): The guests discuss whether nonbanks should be able to access Fed balances or IOER-like returns, linking the issue to broader debates over central bank digital currency and financial intermediation.

Key Arguments: Lehman’s collapse was a pivotal crisis moment, but Galper believes regulators could have saved it and avoided some of the worst spillovers. Repo market confidence matters as much as collateral quality; once counterparties stop lending, funding chains can break quickly. LIBOR is problematic because it relied on bank judgment and became susceptible to manipulation and collusion. SOFR is a stronger benchmark because it is built from observable overnight Treasury-backed repo transactions, not estimates. The U.K., Europe, and the U.S. are all moving toward alternative benchmarks, but LIBOR still has trillions in legacy contracts. The federal funds market has become too small and distorted to serve as a clean benchmark for policy or market pricing. The legacy transition from LIBOR to SOFR will create legal, mechanical, and pricing complications for mortgages and derivatives. Market structure and regulation can materially affect SOFR because it is derived from multiple repo segments, not a single market quote. TNB’s narrow-bank idea is economically coherent because it would arbitrage the spread between cheap deposits and IOER, but it raises broader questions about who should have access to the Fed’s balance sheet. Galper is skeptical of IOER as a policy tool and prefers a corridor-style framework with less emphasis on the Fed paying banks to hold reserves.

Data Points: Derivative contracts maturing before 2021: 82% - Galper cites this share as expected to mature before the LIBOR cessation date, reducing immediate transition risk. Longer-dated derivative contracts remaining after 2021: 18% - The remaining contracts represent the bulk of LIBOR legacy risk after the FCA stops compelling submissions. Value of legacy longer-dated contracts: $36 trillion - These contracts could still be exposed to LIBOR transition problems after 2021. Bank of England / FCA hard stop on compelling LIBOR submissions: End of 2021 - Andrew Bailey announced that banks would no longer be compelled to submit LIBOR after this date. Example tri-party repo rate: 2.25% - Galper cites a recent BNY Mellon tri-party Treasury repo rate. Example DTCC GCF repo rate: 2.35% - Galper cites the DTCC general collateral finance rate as higher than tri-party repo. SOFR components: 3 - Tri-party repo, bilateral DVP repo, and cleared/CCP repo via DTCC’s FICC are described as the components feeding SOFR. Named alternative rates outside the U.S.: SONIA, Ester, TIBOR - These are examples of local benchmark rates replacing or supplementing LIBOR in other markets.

Pivotal Quotes: "I think that Lehman was a pivotal moment." — Josh Galper: His assessment of Lehman’s collapse as a key catalyst in the financial crisis and repo-market panic. "The trouble with that 18% is it amounts to some $36 trillion in value." — Josh Galper: He explains the scale of the remaining LIBOR transition problem after most contracts mature before 2021. "SOFR is a benchmark of only overnight U.S. Treasury repo transactions." — Josh Galper: He summarizes what makes SOFR different from LIBOR and why it is viewed as more observable and reliable.

Implications: Markets are shifting from judgment-based benchmarks to transaction-based ones, but legacy contracts and changing repo market structure mean the transition will be complicated. The Fed, banks, and borrowers should expect legal, operational, and policy ripple effects.

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About Macro Musings

Hosted by David Beckworth of the Mercatus Center, Macro Musings pulls back the curtain on the important macroeconomic issues of the past, present, and future.

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