Episode Summary
Executive Summary: Michael Shermer and philosophers James Davidson Hunter and Paul Nedelisky debate whether science can ground morality. They distinguish explaining moral behavior from justifying moral truths, argue that empirical science may illuminate moral psychology but cannot settle fundamental ethical or metaphysical questions, and explore the role of culture, human universals, pluralism, and theism in shaping moral life and public policy.
Main Topics: Can science ground morality?: The guests argue that science can describe moral behavior and emotional mechanisms, but not by itself determine objective moral truths or resolve deep moral disputes. Three levels of scientific relevance to ethics: They distinguish between level one (science directly proving moral claims), level two (science informing philosophy enough to support or undermine ethical systems), and level three (science explaining the origins and function of moral emotions and behavior). Evolutionary psychology, guilt, and moral emotions: Shermer presses the idea that guilt, shame, reciprocity, and social sanctioning may be explained evolutionarily as tools for cooperation and group survival, while the guests remain skeptical that such accounts fully capture morality. Culture, human universals, and moral development: Hunter emphasizes that human beings are deeply cultural and under-instincted, while Shermer cites anthropological universals to argue for a shared moral nature that culture shapes rather than invents. Theism, natural law, and divine grounding: A surprise turn reveals both guests are theists. They reject crude divine command theory but argue that God may be the source of human dignity, moral capacities, and an objective moral order beyond empirical reduction. Pluralism, authoritarianism, and the limits of consensus: The discussion broadens to modern pluralism, the rise of polarization, the limits of philosophical agreement, and the difficulty of using science or reason to persuade those with opposing moral frameworks. Abortion, rights, and moral imagination: They debate abortion as a conflict of rights and a larger social failure of moral imagination, with both guests favoring a broader ethic of care over simplistic pro-life/pro-choice binaries.
Key Arguments: Science can illuminate how moral emotions and cooperation arise, but that does not automatically establish what is morally right or wrong. There is a crucial difference between explaining moral phenomena and justifying moral claims; the latter may require philosophy, metaphysics, or theology. Human beings are not fully instinct-driven; culture is essential in shaping moral life and social order. Anthropological universals suggest common moral and religious patterns across cultures, supporting the idea of a shared human nature. Objective moral truths may exist, but persuading others of them is far harder than recognizing them privately. Theism can ground human dignity and moral value without reducing morality to arbitrary divine commands. Public discourse is trapped in false binaries and politicization, obscuring more humane, care-based approaches to issues like abortion. Modern societies need moral imagination, not just law and politics, to address flourishing, justice, beauty, and shared social life.
Data Points: Great Courses Plus discount: Free trial plus $30 off annual subscription - Sponsor offer mentioned at the start of the show via thegreatcoursesplus.com/shermer Great Ideas of Philosophy course length: 60 lectures - Used by Shermer as an example of the Great Courses catalog Lecture duration: About 30 minutes each - Typical length of a Great Courses lecture described in the sponsor pitch Playback speed example: 1.2x - Shermer says he listens at slightly higher speed Survey sample size: 3,200 philosophy professors - Shermer cites a 2009 philosophy survey on key metaethical and normative questions Moral realism in survey: 56% - Percentage of respondents identified as moral realists in the cited philosophy survey Moral anti-realism in survey: 27% - Percentage identified as moral anti-realists in the cited philosophy survey Undecided/other on moral realism question: 16% - Additional responses in the survey Shermer cites Cognitivism in moral judgment: 65% - Respondents who held that ethical statements can be true or false Deontology in normative ethics: 32% - One position in the survey’s split among normative ethical theories Consequentialism in normative ethics: 25% - Another position in the same survey Virtue ethics in normative ethics: 24% - Another position in the same survey Other/remaining normative views: 18% - Remaining responses in the normative ethics question Psychopathy prevalence: 1%–3% - Shermer mentions this estimate while discussing social sanctions and free-riding Don Donald Brown human universals: 373 characteristics - Shermer cites Brown’s list of cross-cultural human universals Moral/religious universals in Brown’s list: 202 of 373 (54%) - Shermer says these items are related to morality and religion Human universals publication year: 1991 - Shermer cites Donald Brown’s Human Universals (McGraw-Hill)
Pivotal Quotes: "The central problem is the question of what are the foundations of human flourishing?" — Paul Nedelisky: Opening explanation of the book’s core thesis about the moral quest "There are some of the deepest, most important questions about morality. They don't seem to be the sorts of things that science, at least empirical science, can tell us about." — Paul Nedelisky: On why empirical science may have limits in ethics "I think that the question of evolution is not interesting for me personally, insofar as it's an attempt to explain what we have in common with other species. The interesting evolutionary question to me is: why is it that human beings are so different from other species?" — James Davidson Hunter: On culture, human distinctiveness, and the limits of biological explanation
Implications: The episode suggests that moral debate cannot be settled by science alone: ethics requires philosophy, culture, and possibly theology. For listeners, the takeaway is to distinguish moral psychology from moral justification and to resist simplistic binaries in public policy.