209 | Brad DeLong on Why the 20th Century Fell Short of Utopia

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Sean Carroll and Brad DeLong discuss DeLong’s thesis that the “long 20th century” runs from 1870 to 2010, when globalization, the modern corporation, and industrial research labs enabled a massive acceleration in growth and living standards. The central unresolved question is why this productivity boom produced wealth without utopia, instead alongside war, inequality, and recurring market failures.

Main Topics: The long 20th century as a historical unit (Priority: 5/5): DeLong argues that 1870-2010 is a more meaningful period than a calendar century because it marks a phase transition in global economic and social development. Why 1870 is the watershed (Priority: 5/5): He ties the break to telegraph/submarine telegraph networks, screw-propelled iron steamships, modern corporations, and industrial research labs that greatly increased the pace of innovation and diffusion. From Malthusian stagnation to growth (Priority: 5/5): Before 1870, technological gains were largely offset by population growth and agrarian limits; after 1870, innovation finally outpaced population and living standards rose sharply. The politics of the 20th century: Hayek vs. Polanyi (Priority: 4/5): DeLong frames the century’s ideological struggle as free-market liberalism versus social democracy, with the postwar settlement shifting toward neoliberalism after the 1970s. Why utopia failed (Priority: 5/5): Despite abundant productive capacity, societies struggled to equitably distribute wealth, secure full employment, and prevent war, exploitation, financial crises, and environmental damage. The end of the long 20th century around 2010 (Priority: 4/5): DeLong chooses 2010 because the postwar order, financial stability, technological momentum, and climate complacency all began to break down around that time. What should come next (Priority: 3/5): DeLong favors a renewed social-democratic approach with public provision and income support, while emphasizing that future solutions remain uncertain and underdeveloped.

Key Arguments: Pre-1870 history is best understood through the Malthusian trap: technology improved slowly, but population growth absorbed gains, leaving living standards largely stagnant. The key shift around 1870 was not one thing but a system: the modern corporation, industrial research laboratories, and global markets together made innovation scalable and economically valuable. The Industrial Revolution alone was not enough; it produced a steampunk world, but not the institutional machinery needed for sustained 2%+ annual technological growth. Economic growth in the 20th century was real and enormous, but it did not solve distribution, power, or political coordination problems. Social democracy briefly seemed viable after World War II, but it failed to deliver sustainable equality and was displaced by neoliberalism in the Reagan-Thatcher era. Finance is a domain where markets often work poorly because it is mostly money-now-versus-money-later and is especially vulnerable to misunderstanding, risk shifting, and grift. The book’s central puzzle is not how to produce enough—humanity largely solved that—but how to slice it fairly and use it well. Global warming and the weakening of the post-2010 order suggest that the next historical era will be defined less by growth than by managing planetary constraints and political instability.

Data Points: Long 20th century span: 1870 to 2010 - DeLong’s proposed historical periodization Average technological growth after 1870: ~2.1% per year - DeLong’s estimate of sustained technological growth from 1870-2010 Technological growth before 1870: less than 0.5% per year - Pre-modern and early industrial growth rate Pre-1500 technological growth: ~0.05% per year (one twentieth of a percent) - Illustrates near-stagnation before modern growth acceleration Population growth under pre-industrial conditions: ~1.4-1.5% per year - Used to explain the Malthusian trap when tech growth is too slow World average income in 1870: about $1,200/year - Rough benchmark for global living standards before the modern growth era World average income around 1500: about $900/year - Shows how little global living standards changed over centuries before 1870 World average income today: about $13,000/year - Evidence of major material progress by the present day Premodern fertility pattern: 8 pregnancies, 6 live births, 3 children surviving to age 6, 2 reproducing - Describes how harsh mortality shaped family life in agrarian societies Child mortality among English queens: about 1 in 7 died in childbirth - Used to illustrate the danger of childbirth before modern medicine Height decline with agriculture: from about 5'8" to 5'3" - Average adult male height drop from hunter-gatherer to agrarian societies Modern information-good example: $12 Kindle price / $1.20 author share - Used to argue that GDP understates consumer surplus in digital/information goods Global poor living at pre-industrial standards: 500 million people - DeLong calls this a scandal in an otherwise rich world U.S. military mobilization example: 2.1 million men - Referenced as part of the modern corporate/organizational revolution during the Civil War era

Pivotal Quotes: "the long 20th century that begins in 1870 and ends in 2010" — Sean Carroll: Opening framing of DeLong’s thesis and the episode’s central historical claim "the market giveth, the market taketh away, blessed be the name of the market" — Brad DeLong: Summarizing the Hayekian belief that markets should be trusted despite their failures "we need to think harder" — Brad DeLong: His concluding response to the question of what comes next after the breakdown of the neoliberal/post-2010 order

Implications: Listeners should take away that modern prosperity rests on institutions, not just ideas or inventions. The next era likely depends on rebuilding social coordination, fair distribution, and climate-capable governance rather than assuming markets alone will deliver progress.