Episode Summary
Executive Summary: Michael Shermer argues that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is a pretext-driven act of revanchist autocracy, and that the best response is not war but coordinated economic sanctions and international outcasting. He supports this with legal-history and conflict-data showing that outlawing war, trade, democracy, and transparency all reduce interstate violence.
Main Topics: Putin’s invasion as a manufactured casus belli: Shermer portrays Putin’s recognition of breakaway regions and invasion of Ukraine as a transparent false-flag-style justification for aggression, comparing it to absurd territorial ruses and Soviet-era propaganda logic. Why tyrants still need excuses for war: He argues that since war has been morally and legally delegitimized, modern dictators must invent self-defense narratives and legalistic rationales to mask conquest and satisfy domestic and international audiences. The outlawry of war and the Kellogg-Briand Pact: Shermer traces the historical shift from war as a normal instrument of statecraft to war as outlawed behavior, emphasizing Salmon Levinson’s campaign and the 1928 peace pact as a turning point. Outcasting and economic sanctions as alternatives to armed conflict: He presents sanctions and exclusion from global systems as the most effective response to aggression, arguing that economic pressure is generally preferable to military intervention. Data on peace: democracy, trade, and international organizations: Using political science research, Shermer explains that peace is more likely when countries are democratic, economically interdependent, and embedded in international institutions that increase transparency. Costs and consequences of conquest in the modern era: He cites historical data showing that interstate conquest has sharply declined after World War II, implying that the global system now makes territorial seizure far less common and far more costly. Limits, uncertainty, and the risk of escalation: Shermer closes by stressing that no one knows exactly how Putin will proceed, but argues that sanctions are the least-bad option compared with a potentially catastrophic military escalation.
Key Arguments: Putin’s stated justification for invading Ukraine is a cover story; the military buildup and recognized separatist states make the pretext obvious. War has been progressively delegitimized since 1928, so aggressors now rely on legalistic or moralized excuses rather than open conquest. Economic sanctions and international isolation are a better response than armed conflict because they reduce violence without triggering large-scale war. Democracy, trade, and membership in international organizations each lower the likelihood of interstate disputes, especially when combined. After World War II, the rate and scale of conquests fell dramatically, suggesting that modern outcasting works in practice. Military intervention risks far greater costs, including prolonged war and possible nuclear escalation, so sanctions are the rational option. Putin is driven by revanchism and absolute power rather than utilitarian calculation, making him dangerous but still constrained by international pressure.
Data Points: Troop buildup near Ukraine: nearly 200,000 - Russian troops and war materiel amassed on Ukraine’s border and coastline before the invasion Date of recognition of separatist regions: February 21 - Putin officially recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk separatist entities War manifestos analyzed: over 400 - Hathaway and Shapiro’s database of justifications for war Self-defense as a justification for war: 69% - Most common reason found in war manifestos Treaty obligations: 47% - Second-most common justification category in the database Compensation for tortious injuries: 42% - Frequently cited reason for war in the content analysis Violations of laws of war/law of nations: 35% - Another common war rationale in the manifestos Stopping threats to balance of power: 33% - Strategic justification cited in many war declarations Protection of trade interests: 19% - Trade-related rationale for war in the manifesto database Moral/legal milestone: 1928 - Year the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war Democracy scale: 1 to 10 - Polity Project-style scale used to measure democratic competitiveness and constraints Conflict reduction between two democracies: 50% - Russett and O’Neill found disputes decrease by half when both states are fully democratic Increase in dispute risk with autocracy/low democracy: doubled - When one state in a dyad is a low-scoring democracy or autocracy At-risk nations and trade measure: trade as a proportion of GDP - Higher trade dependence predicted fewer militarized disputes in the next year Conquests per year, 1816-1928: 1.21 per year - About one conquest every 10 months before the outlawry of war fully took hold Annual territorial loss, 1816-1928: 295,000 square kilometers - Average amount of land lost per year in that period Conquests per year, 1929-1948: 1.15 per year - Rate remained high through the interwar/WWII period Annual territorial loss, 1929-1948: 240,000 square kilometers - Average annual land loss during the interwar and WWII era Conquests per year, post-1948: 0.26 per year - Sharp decline in conquest after World War II and the rise of sanctions/outcasting Annual territorial loss, post-1948: 14,950 square kilometers - Order-of-magnitude reduction in average land lost each year Risk of conquest per year before 1949: 1.33% - Likelihood an average state would suffer conquest before the postwar order Risk of conquest per year from 1949 onward: 0.17% - Likelihood dropped to roughly once or twice a millennium Russian oligarch assets mentioned: over $80 billion - Assets of oligarchs targeted by sanctions and freezes U.S. political ordering remark: about 8 or 9 out of 10; now about 6 - Shermer’s comment on the U.S. Polity Project score declining over time
Pivotal Quotes: "The outlawry of war has forced tyrants to concoct excuses for invading other countries." — Michael Shermer: Central thesis of the episode and column "We should have not as now laws of war, but laws against war, just as there are no laws of murder or of poisoning, but laws against them." — Salmon Levinson: Quoting the legal reformer whose ideas helped inspire the Kellogg-Briand Pact "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." — Lord Acton: Shermer uses this to frame Putin’s authoritarian rule and moral corruption
Implications: Listeners are urged to view sanctions, trade restrictions, and international coordination as the least-bad response to aggression. The episode argues that preserving the postwar anti-conquest norm matters for Ukraine and for deterring future territorial revanchism.