#289 – Stephen Kotkin: Putin, Zelenskyy, and War in Ukraine

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Stephen Kotkin argues that Putin’s war on Ukraine is best understood as a recurring Russian geopolitical choice driven by resentment, imperial ambition, and a failed effort to close the gap with the West—not as an inevitable cultural trait or a simple NATO reaction. He contrasts Russia’s corrupt autocracy with Ukraine’s flawed democracy, explains why Ukrainian resistance reshaped the West, and warns that the war may still escalate or settle into a protracted struggle.

Main Topics: Putin, Stalin, and Russian geopolitical “perpetual geopolitics” (Priority: 5/5): Kotkin compares Putin and Stalin as rulers operating from the same Kremlin tradition of seeking great-power status from a position of weakness. He emphasizes that Russia repeatedly chooses coercive strategies to manage the West-dominance gap, which instead worsen Russia’s position. The NATO-expansion argument and responsibility for war (Priority: 5/5): Kotkin rejects the claim that NATO expansion forced Putin’s invasion. He insists sovereign states may choose alliances, cites international agreements, and argues that blaming NATO obscures Putin’s agency and the broader pattern of Russian aggression. Ukraine as corrupt democracy vs. Russia as corrupt autocracy (Priority: 5/5): He distinguishes Ukraine’s flawed but real democratic institutions—parliament, public sphere, elections—from Russia’s autocratic system, arguing that corruption alone does not make regimes equivalent and that repression in Russia is structural and lethal. Resentment, humiliation, and authoritarian psychology (Priority: 4/5): Kotkin frames Kremlin behavior as driven by resentment among post-Soviet losers and elites who seek to reverse their domestic and international loss of status. This fuels conspiratorial thinking about the West and justifies domestic theft and external aggression. Ukrainian resistance, Zelensky, and the reawakening of the West (Priority: 5/5): He praises Ukraine’s battlefield and information-war effectiveness, especially Zelensky’s leadership and refusal to flee, arguing that Ukrainian resistance forced the West to rediscover its own resolve, reduce energy dependence, and arm Ukraine more heavily. China, Russia, and the limits of a multipolar world (Priority: 4/5): Kotkin argues the world remains Western-dominated institutionally and financially, despite resentment from China and Russia. He says Xi Jinping’s alignment with Putin damaged China’s Western wedge strategy and may have weakened Chinese grand strategy. War, escalation, and the uncertain future (Priority: 4/5): Kotkin discusses battlefield outcomes, nuclear risk, the possibility of Russian military disintegration, and the uncertainty of long-term inflection points. He stresses that wars are hard to start and harder to end, and that future shocks could redirect history.

Key Arguments: Russia’s behavior is not the product of an eternal cultural tendency toward aggression; it is a repeated strategic choice rooted in the mismatch between imperial aspiration and actual capability. Putin and Stalin are comparable in methods and institutional setting, but not in scale of mass murder or historical singularity. NATO expansion did not force Russia to invade; sovereign states have the legal right to choose alliances under treaties Russia itself signed. The West has often tried to integrate and assist Russia, but Russian elites interpret events through a conspiratorial lens and exploit the West while condemning it. Ukraine’s institutions were flawed, but still fundamentally democratic; Russia’s were autocratic, with no real checks on power or independent judiciary. Russian authoritarianism suffocates not only political liberty but also economic, scientific, and cultural development because it prioritizes hard power and elite theft over human capital. Ukrainian resistance changed the strategic environment by compelling Western unity, military aid, and reduced appeasement toward Moscow. Putin may believe he can still outlast the West, given territory gained, Ukraine’s economic strain, and global ambiguity, but this is a high-risk gamble. China and India may avoid condemning Russia, but they are not rushing to materially support Russian aggression, partly because they understand Western power and sanctions risk. The world is not truly multipolar; major global institutions, finance, and military alliances remain Western-led. Authoritarian regimes can survive by suppressing alternatives even while failing in most other governance tasks. Human courage, especially Ukrainian courage, is central to resisting aggression and shaping political outcomes.

Data Points: Stephen Kotkin Stalin biography: 3 volumes planned; 2 published - Introduced at the beginning of the episode as Kotkin’s major scholarly project Putin in power: 22+ years - Used to frame Putin’s long rule and ambitions Russia’s estimated war victims under Stalin: 18–20 million - Kotkin contrasts Stalin’s mass killing with Putin’s much smaller but still catastrophic scale Mao’s killings: More than Stalin - Kotkin notes Mao exceeded Stalin in death toll because Mao had a larger population to kill Ukraine approval for Zelensky before war: ~25% - Kotkin cites Zelensky’s low popularity before the 2022 invasion Ukraine approval for Zelensky after invasion: 90%+ - He highlights the dramatic rally-around-the-flag effect Ukraine monthly funding need: $5–8 billion/month - Kotkin describes the wartime fiscal burden of keeping Ukraine functioning U.S. aid package to Ukraine: $40 billion - Referenced as newly signed U.S. support Russian military losses (estimate): ~50,000–60,000 - Kotkin estimates dead and wounded amounting to roughly a third of the original force in the field Russian male life expectancy: ~69 years - Used when discussing Putin’s age and survival prospects Sochi Olympics cost: $50 billion official cost - Kotkin uses it as an example of Russian state waste/corruption Ukraine unemployment during war: 33%–50% - He notes wartime economic collapse makes standard labor metrics difficult NATO founding/legality context: Multiple treaties cited - Kotkin references UN Charter, Helsinki Agreement (1975), Paris Charter (1990), and NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997) as supporting sovereign choice of alliances

Pivotal Quotes: "Freedom is better than unfreedom, Lex. It’s a lot better than unfreedom." — Stephen Kotkin: A direct moral and political summary of why institutions matter "The West was in decline and that the rest of the world had risen... turns out to be empirically false." — Stephen Kotkin: On the claim that the world is now multipolar and the West is no longer dominant "The Ukrainians surprised everybody... That sacrifice, that gift, enabled the West to rediscover itself." — Stephen Kotkin: On why Ukrainian resistance transformed Western policy and resolve

Implications: Kotkin’s framework implies the war is about agency, institutions, and strategic choice, not inevitability. For listeners, the key takeaway is that Ukraine’s resistance, Western resolve, and authoritarian decline in Russia and China may reshape geopolitics for years.