Macro Musings
Macro Musings

Adam Posen on *The Price of Nostalgia: America's Self-Defeating Economic Retreat*

Adam Posen is the President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Previously, Adam was on the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England. He has also worked at the New York Fed and has advised many central banks and governments. Adam is also a returning guest to the podcast an

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David Beckworth HostAdam Posen Guest

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Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Adam Posen argues that U.S. economic distress is being misdiagnosed as the result of excessive globalization, when in fact America has been retreating from trade, immigration, and foreign investment for decades. He also criticizes nostalgia for manufacturing and local revival, and proposes mobility-enhancing reforms so workers can move without losing security.

Main Topics: America’s retreat from globalization (Priority: 5/5): Posen argues the U.S. has been disengaging from trade, immigration, FDI, and trade agreements for 20+ years, so claims that elites 'sold out' workers through globalization are historically wrong. The China shock and its limits (Priority: 5/5): He acknowledges real localized harm from Chinese competition but says the macro effect was smaller than commonly believed and did not change long-run employment or wage trends. Manufacturing nostalgia and labor-market transformation (Priority: 5/5): Posen says manufacturing decline is mainly technological and global, not something trade policy can reverse enough to rebuild the middle class, since most non-college workers are in services. Local revival and redistribution skepticism (Priority: 4/5): He rejects the idea that large subsidies or place-based revival programs can reliably restore lagging regions, citing Germany, Japan, Italy, and China as evidence that people move, not places. Policies to support worker mobility (Priority: 5/5): Instead of forcing jobs to stay in place, he supports childcare, portable benefits, healthcare access, transportation, and zoning reform to make geographic/job mobility less costly. Macro side conversations: Fed framework, hysteresis, secular stagnation, demographics (Priority: 3/5): Before the main article discussion, Posen reviews the Fed’s new framework, doubts strong hysteresis claims, and argues secular stagnation is driven more by real-side productivity and innovation slowdown than demand alone.

Key Arguments: The U.S. is not a story of excessive globalization; it has had declining trade openness, lower immigration, and weaker FDI than in prior decades. The political narrative that trade with China devastated the U.S. middle class is overstated because the overall economy saw continuous labor turnover and the manufacturing share was already on a secular decline. China shock effects were highly localized and real, but their aggregate magnitude was small relative to total U.S. job churn. Manufacturing employment cannot be restored to its former role because technology lets firms produce more with fewer workers and consumer demand for manufactures falls as incomes rise. Service-sector workers—often women and minorities—have experienced just as much disruption as manufacturing workers, but receive less political attention. Place-based rescue strategies usually fail; mobility and portability are more realistic ways to help workers adjust. The Fed’s new framework is directionally sound, but a large fiscal expansion creates a difficult test and may generate inflation above politically tolerable levels. Evidence for strong positive or negative hysteresis is weaker than many advocates suggest; the case for a large permanent output boost from temporary overheating is not well established. Secular stagnation is best understood as a real-side slowdown in innovation diffusion and risk appetite, not just a monetary problem. Demographic aging may matter more through saving, investment, and innovation behavior than through a simple labor shortage/inflation channel.

Data Points: Years of U.S. retreat from globalization: 20+ years - Posen argues U.S. trade openness has been declining for decades. U.S. trade share: Lower now than in much of the past period - He says the U.S. economy is less trade-integrated than many assume. Immigration: Much lower than 20-30 years ago - Used to support the claim that the U.S. is retreating from globalization. Foreign direct investment: Flattened nominally and declining in real terms - Posen says inbound FDI and Greenfield FDI have weakened. Japan economic policy improvement period: 6-7 years - He praises recent Japanese policy changes during this period. Fed framework timing: Announcement last August; Jackson Hole speech 2.5 years earlier - Posen traces the Fed’s shift from Powell’s earlier speech to the formal framework change. Manufacturing employment share in Germany: About 17% - Used as a comparison to show manufacturing remains a limited employer even in export-oriented economies. Manufacturing employment share in the U.S.: 8% to 12% - Illustrates the long-run decline in manufacturing’s role in U.S. employment. China shock job losses in cited research: About 2 million jobs - Posen summarizes the Autor-Dorn-Hanson estimate as an upper bound. Alternative estimate of China shock job losses: Close to 1 million jobs - He notes some re-estimations produce smaller numbers. Annual U.S. job churn: 60 million jobs per year - Used to show China shock losses were small relative to overall labor-market turnover. Involuntary job loss assumption: About one-third of churn - Posen uses this to frame the China-shock losses as a small share of total churn. Annual involuntary job loss implied: 20 million per year - Derived from one-third of 60 million annual job churn. China shock share of churn: Less than 1% - Posen’s rough comparison of 130,000 annualized losses to 20 million involuntary separations. Trade deal expansion in Europe: 13 new EU member states since 2000 - Used to contrast Europe’s integration with U.S. retrenchment. Japanese inflation / catch-up concern: Mid-threes - Posen worries inflation could rise to the mid-3% range if catch-up is too fast. Secular stagnation onset: Around 2004 - He cites evidence that productivity and innovation slowdown began before the financial crisis.

Pivotal Quotes: "We, the Washington Blob, sold out American workers to liberalization for trade, including especially letting China trade." — Adam Posen: He is criticizing the dominant political narrative that blames globalization for U.S. inequality and anger. "The people of services ... are coping with turmoil and labor market churn and issues of inequality. And they're not traded services for the most part ... and nobody seems to care about that the same way they get all wound up about some town in West Virginia." — Adam Posen: He argues that service-sector disruption is ignored relative to manufacturing nostalgia. "You can make it so that it's less scary and less dangerous for people to move." — Adam Posen: He summarizes his policy preference for mobility-enhancing reforms over place-preserving subsidies.

Implications: Listeners should expect less payoff from protectionism and local-industrial nostalgia than politicians promise. The more durable strategy is to make workers adaptable through portable benefits, childcare, housing, and mobility-supporting reforms.

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About Macro Musings

Hosted by David Beckworth of the Mercatus Center, Macro Musings pulls back the curtain on the important macroeconomic issues of the past, present, and future.

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