Does the economy still matter for elections? With John Burn-Murdoch

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: John Byrne Murdoch argues that economics still matters in elections, but less through simple approval of the economy and more through partisan filtering, cultural identity, and turnout. The US shows extreme polarization and weak responsiveness to economy or scandals; the UK shows volatile switching and a highly distorted first-past-the-post system. Both countries face major electoral and democratic stresses, with immigration and education now more salient than income alone.

Main Topics: Economy and electoral performance (Priority: 5/5): The discussion tests whether inflation, growth, and consumer sentiment still predict election outcomes. John argues the classic economy-vs-government relationship has weakened sharply, especially in the US, while remaining somewhat visible in parts of Europe and increasingly in the UK. Partisanship distorting economic perceptions (Priority: 5/5): Survey responses about the economy increasingly reflect party identity rather than objective conditions. Supporters of each party tend to view the economy more favorably when their side is in power, and less favorably when it is not. Economic hardship, culture, and realignment (Priority: 4/5): The speakers examine whether left-behind voters are reacting to economic shocks. John says there is a real effect, but it mostly operates through values, demographics, Brexit, Trump-style populism, and broader social identity rather than pure material deprivation. Immigration as a political issue (Priority: 4/5): The transcript contrasts US and UK immigration debates. The US is described as more capable of distinguishing legal from illegal immigration, enabling more evidence-based discussion; the UK is said to use immigration as an overly blunt, undifferentiated category. Broken US politics vs broken UK politics (Priority: 5/5): A comparative section argues the US is too entrenched and unresponsive, while the UK is too volatile and distorted by first-past-the-post. The US suffers from polarization; the UK from unstable party attachment and disproportional outcomes. 2024 election outlooks in the US and UK (Priority: 5/5): John predicts a huge Labour win in the UK and a disastrous Conservative result, while expecting Trump to be the likeliest winner in the US, though with close polling and uncertainty around Biden's position. Age polarization and future party competition (Priority: 3/5): The conversation closes on whether UK age polarization is permanent or tied to Conservative leadership. Reform UK may change the pattern by attracting younger voters, suggesting the British age divide could evolve rather than remain fixed.

Key Arguments: The old model where economic conditions strongly shaped approval of governments has weakened since the early 2000s, especially in the US. In the US, consumer sentiment and presidential approval no longer move together; in the UK and Western Europe the link is still present but weakening. Survey answers about the economy often reveal partisan allegiance rather than economic reality; people interpret economic questions through political identity. Some voters do react to economic disruption, but the effect is filtered through culture, values, and populist alignment more than direct material hardship. The Red Wall and Trump coalitions are better explained by demographic and cultural realignment than by poverty alone. Education has replaced income as the main socioeconomic divide in voting behavior in many places. Immigration debates are healthier in the US because legal and illegal immigration are discussed separately; the UK’s all-purpose use of the word obscures policy tradeoffs. The UK’s first-past-the-post system creates severe seat-vote distortion, especially now that politics is effectively multi-party. The US is “more broken” because entrenched polarization makes elections and scandals have little effect on outcomes. The UK is “more broken” in a different way: weak party attachment produces volatility and large seat swings from modest vote changes. John expects Labour to win a very large majority and Reform UK to win a substantial vote share but very few seats. If Biden exits the race, Democrats may gain because he is underperforming generic Democratic candidates across several electoral measures.

Data Points: US economy-politics relationship: Essentially zero - John says the relationship between views of the economy and views of the president has become almost nonexistent in the US. Early 2000s: Divergence begins - He identifies the early 2000s as the point when the classic economy-government relationship started to weaken globally. UK Conservative government period: 14 years - Ipsos data show Conservative voters have been more optimistic about the economy throughout the party's long tenure. Labour government period: Until May 1997 / 2010 - He cites a flip in economic optimism between Labour and Conservative voters when government changed hands. US consumer sentiment vs Biden approval: Sentiment up; approval flat or declining - As inflation receded, consumer sentiment improved while Biden's approval did not follow. Trump support among low-income voters: Higher than past Republicans - John notes Trump now wins a significantly higher share of low-income voters than Republicans used to. UK voter switching: As many as 40% - Recent UK elections have seen very high levels of switching between parties. Possible UK voter switching this year: Up to 50% - John says this election could see even more switching than usual. Labour vote share forecast: About 41% - Projected UK vote share under the polling scenario he describes. Labour seat share forecast: About 71% - Projected result under first-past-the-post, showing severe overrepresentation. Right-wing vote share forecast (Conservatives + Reform UK): About 35-36% - Combined vote share of the two right-wing parties in the UK forecast. Right-wing seat share forecast: As few as 10% - John says the Conservatives and Reform UK could be drastically underrepresented in seats. Conservative seats in current parliament: 365 - He contrasts the last election result with the projected collapse to around 100 seats. Conservative seat forecast: About 100 of 650 - His forecast for the Conservatives' worst-ever result. Labour seat forecast: Around 450-460 - His forecast for a historically large Labour majority. Reform UK vote share forecast: 15-20% - Expected vote share, despite minimal seat conversion. Reform UK seats forecast: 1-3 seats - Expected under first-past-the-post despite significant vote share. Young Britons willing to vote Conservative: 7-8% - He cites very low Conservative support among under-30s in the UK. Trump conviction polling effect: Almost none - Polling did not move materially after Trump's conviction, according to John.

Pivotal Quotes: "the relationship is weak to non-existent" — John Byrne Murdoch: Describing how views of the economy and views of leaders no longer track each other in the US and increasingly the UK. "they're just telling you how people are going to vote, essentially" — Samaya Keynes: Summarizing the idea that economic sentiment surveys may be capturing partisan intent rather than genuine economic assessments. "the US system is more broken than us" — John Byrne Murdoch: His final judgment in the US-versus-UK comparison of political dysfunction.

Implications: Elections are increasingly shaped by identity, turnout, and system design rather than simple economic performance. Expect continued volatility in the UK, entrenched polarization in the US, and major pressure on how democracies measure, debate, and translate voter sentiment into power.