Episode Summary
Executive Summary: The interview profiles Cliff Asness, founder of AQR, and explores how quantitative investing uses systematic factors like value, momentum, quality, and diversification to seek returns across asset classes. Asness defends some hedge fund strategies, critiques fees and partial hedging, argues current stocks and bonds are expensive by history, and reflects on the 2007 quant crisis, where crowded factor trades—not model failure—drove losses.
Main Topics: Cliff Asness’s background and quantitative investing origins (Priority: 5/5): Barry Ritholtz introduces Asness’s elite academic and industry path: UPenn Wharton/engineering, Chicago PhD work with Eugene Fama and Ken French, Goldman Sachs, and founding AQR. Asness explains he was drawn to finance for its intellectual challenge and systematic nature. How quant investing works: value, momentum, quality, diversification (Priority: 5/5): Asness explains quant investing as betting on averaged, diversified factor effects rather than stock-picking intuition. He emphasizes value, momentum, quality, low beta, and cross-asset implementation with rigorous out-of-sample testing. Hedge fund critique and AQR’s model (Priority: 4/5): He argues many hedge funds are too net-long, too expensive, and not hedged enough to justify their fees. He contrasts that with AQR’s lower-fee, more transparent approach and notes some hedge strategies do make economic sense. Market valuation outlook and return expectations (Priority: 5/5): Asness says both stocks and bonds are historically expensive and that investors should expect lower future real returns, especially in a 60/40 portfolio. He distinguishes expensive markets from true bubbles. The 2007 quant crisis and crowded trades (Priority: 5/5): He describes the August 2007 drawdown as a crowded-factor unwind rather than a failure of quant methods. The issue was simultaneous deleveraging by many similar strategies, not the collapse of value or momentum itself. Smart beta, fundamental indexing, and Buffett (Priority: 4/5): Asness discusses smart beta as mostly a repackaging of value tilts, while praising fundamental indexing as useful but not truly new. He also explains how AQR’s research shows Buffett’s returns map to systematic tilts toward value, quality, and moderate leverage. High-frequency trading and market structure (Priority: 3/5): He defends most HFT as cheaper market-making that lowers trading costs, while acknowledging concerns about packet sniffing and liquidity disappearing in stress. He sees it as an arms race but not uniquely malicious.
Key Arguments: Quant investing is built on statistical averages and diversification, not on finding one or two perfect trades. Value, momentum, and quality have long-run evidence across stocks, countries, bonds, currencies, and commodities. Out-of-sample testing is essential because backtests can manufacture false patterns. Many hedge funds are misdescribed as hedged; they are often partially long equity risk and charge too much for it. AQR’s strategy is to fully hedge, take deliberate risk where justified, and charge lower fees than traditional hedge funds. The 2007 quant crisis was driven by crowded positioning and forced deleveraging, not by the breakdown of quant logic itself. Stocks and bonds both look expensive by historical standards, implying subdued future real returns. True bubbles require extreme pricing with no plausible future return; expensive markets are not always bubbles. Fundamental indexing is mostly another expression of the value factor, not a wholly new invention. Buffett’s long-term success can be explained in part by systematic exposure to value, quality, and modest leverage. High-frequency trading usually lowers costs by providing liquidity, though abusive information advantages should be stopped. Great strategies that you cannot stick with are worse than merely good strategies that investors can endure.
Data Points: AQR assets under management: about $120 billion - Barry introduces Cliff Asness as founder and CIO of AQR Goldman Sachs Global Alpha launch age: 29 - Asness says he formed the fund at Goldman Sachs at age 29 1998 AQR launch period: late 1998 - Asness says AQR was launched after a successful run at Goldman Hedge fund fees discussed: 2 and 20 - Asness criticizes the classic hedge fund fee model as excessive for partially hedged exposure AQR Delta Fund fee: 1 and 10 - Barry references AQR’s lower-fee fund structure Net-long exposure of many hedge funds: about 40% net long stocks - Asness argues many hedge funds are not truly hedged Vanguard study comparison: 60-40 unleveraged portfolio beat about 99% of hedge funds - Barry cites the post-2008 Vanguard analysis AQR drawdown during quant crisis: 13% in a week - The August 2007 quant unwind hit AQR severely AQR asset contraction: from $39 billion to $17 billion - Barry notes the firm’s asset shrinkage during the crisis period S&P 500 bear-market peak-to-trough: 57% - Asness references the broader market drawdown during the financial crisis Expected real return on stocks: about 4% - Asness estimates forward real stock returns from current valuations Expected real return on bonds: about 0.5% - Asness describes bond real yields as near zero Expected real return on 60/40 portfolio: about 2.5% - Asness combines stock and bond expectations into a low prospective return for balanced portfolios Historical real return on 60/40 portfolio: about 5% - Asness says long-run historical real return has been roughly double the forward expectation CAPE valuation level: around 25 - Asness references Shiller CAPE as evidence of expensive equities
Pivotal Quotes: "If it's in the data, write the paper." — Eugene Fama: Asness recalls Fama’s response when he proposed writing a dissertation on momentum "The great strategy you can't stick with is obviously vastly inferior to the very good strategy you can stick with." — Cliff Asness: Asness explains why investor behavior and endurance matter as much as model quality "We were looking the Grim Reaper in the face." — Cliff Asness: Asness describes the emotional intensity of the August 2007 quant crisis
Implications: Investors should expect lower returns, pay attention to fees and true hedging, and judge managers by process and capacity, not recent performance. Quant factors remain viable, but crowded trades and leverage can create sharp short-term pain.
About Masters in Business
Barry Ritholtz speaks with the people that shape markets, investing and business.