Musa al-Gharbi on Elite Wokeness, Islam, and Social Movements

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Tyler Cowen interviews sociologist Musa Al-Gharbi about his book We Have Never Been Woke and the rise and decline of “awokenings” among knowledge-economy elites. Al-Gharbi argues these movements recur historically, are driven by elite overproduction plus broader social strain, and fade as coalitions fracture and conditions improve. The discussion also ranges across Islam, Protestantism, black Muslim history, migration, and religion's role in shaping modern political identity.

Main Topics: The rise and decline of “great awokenings” (Priority: 5/5): Al-Gharbi argues the recent wave of elite social-justice activism peaked around 2021 and is now tapering, fitting a recurring historical pattern rather than a one-off social-media event. Elite overproduction and coalition instability (Priority: 5/5): He explains awokenings as emerging when too many elite aspirants compete for too few elite positions, but they decay because coalitions of frustrated aspirants and broader publics are inherently unstable. Competing explanations for wokeness (Priority: 4/5): Cowen proposes media, universities, feminization, and social media as drivers; Al-Gharbi agrees these matter but says they cannot explain the repeated historical cycles of awokening. Psychology, symbolic professions, and ideology (Priority: 4/5): The conversation explores whether left-leaning ideology and the culture of symbolic professions correlate with higher neuroticism, more ideological thinking, and more extreme political behavior. Religion, Islam, and civilizational differences (Priority: 4/5): They discuss how Muslim societies, Protestantism, Catholic history, and the category of the “weird” West shape the reception of woke politics, and how modern Islamist politics is a recent product of modernity. Black Muslim identity and American Islam (Priority: 3/5): Al-Gharbi reflects on being a Muslim who is black, the distinct history of black Islam in America, and the decline of the Nation of Islam as a political force. Future research on the knowledge economy and its outsiders (Priority: 3/5): Al-Gharbi says his next project will examine people socially distant from knowledge workers—rural and working-class Americans—and the tensions between these groups.

Key Arguments: Awokenings are historically recurring phenomena; Al-Gharbi identifies three prior episodes before the current one: the 1920s–early 1930s, mid-1960s–late 1970s, and late 1980s–early 1990s. The recent great awokening appears to have peaked around 2021, and several measures of elite social-justice orientation are now declining. Elite overproduction creates motive: people who have done everything “right” but face weak labor-market and housing outcomes become dissatisfied and politically mobilized. Awokenings also require broader social strain; when ordinary people are also struggling, frustrated elites can form a larger coalition for change. These coalitions are unstable because many participants mainly want elite inclusion, and once some are absorbed, they disengage. Symbolic-capitalist institutions select for people who are more ideological, conscientious, and cognitively sophisticated, but also more conformist and extreme. Social media and feminization of professions matter for shaping contemporary woke culture, but they cannot explain earlier awokenings that occurred without those conditions. Al-Gharbi suggests the relationship between progressive ideology and neuroticism may run both ways: progressive commitments can increase rumination, but neurotic personalities may also be drawn to progressivism. Modern political Islam is not a pure return to tradition; it is significantly shaped by modern technology, colonialism, oil wealth, and 20th-century geopolitical change. Immigrant assimilation usually increases in second and third generations, though tensions persist when migration is large-scale and enclaves form. France’s militant secularism, more than Islam alone, helps explain some integration conflicts with Muslims. Al-Gharbi views religion as socially constructed yet grounded in deeper truths, drawing on Al-Farabi and Al-Biruni as important Islamic social thinkers.

Data Points: Number of prior awokening episodes identified: 3 - Al-Gharbi says there were three previous episodes before the current one: 1920s–early 1930s, mid-1960s–late 1970s, and late 1980s–early 1990s. Current awokening peak: Around 2021 - He states that empirical measures suggest the recent great awokening peaked around 2021 and is now declining. Start of modern shift: Around 2010 - He dates the major shift in how knowledge-economy professionals talk about social justice to roughly 2010, with race/gender/sexuality changes starting around 2011. Occupy Wall Street timing: 2011 and earlier - He points to Occupy Wall Street as part of the pre-2011 buildup in elite social-justice politics. Length of current book project focus: About 15 years - He says he has been Muslim for about 15 years. Next book timeline: A couple of years - He plans to spend the next couple of years researching the follow-up project on socially distant groups.

Pivotal Quotes: "it seems like starting after 2011 with race, gender, and sexuality and stuff, but starting a year before that with Occupy Wall Street and things like this... there was this significant shift among knowledge economy professionals" — Musa Al-Gharbi: Explaining the timing of the recent great awokening and how it changed elite discourse. "they don't always have the means" — Musa Al-Gharbi: Summarizing why elite overproduction alone does not produce successful movements without broader social conditions and coalition support. "We Have Never Been Woke, The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite" — Tyler Cowen: The book title anchoring the interview and its central thesis about knowledge-economy elites.

Implications: The interview suggests woke politics is cyclical, elite-driven, and fragile rather than permanently ascendant. For institutions, the key question is how status competition, cultural signaling, and social fragmentation reshape future elite politics and intergroup conflict.