S3 Ep50: The Black Death

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: The episode examines the Black Death as the most severe mortality shock in European history and a natural experiment for economic historians. Mark Koyama explains how its scale, uneven spread, and long-run effects help test Malthusian, Smithian, and institutional theories, showing that impacts varied by region, institutions, and factor endowments.

Main Topics: Scale and lethality of the Black Death (Priority: 5/5): The discussion contrasts COVID-19 with the Black Death, emphasizing that the medieval plague killed an estimated 40% of Europe and had far higher case fatality rates than modern pandemics. Data quality and historical uncertainty (Priority: 4/5): Koyama describes the sources used to reconstruct mortality—chronicles, tax records, archaeological plague pits—and notes major gaps, especially outside Western Europe. Determinants of local mortality (Priority: 5/5): The episode argues that population density and city size were not strong predictors of mortality; proximity to early outbreak routes and rat ecology mattered more than urbanization or trade connections alone. Malthusian versus Smithian effects (Priority: 5/5): The Black Death is presented as a shock that can raise wages in a labor-scarce Malthusian setting while also disrupting trade and specialization in a Smithian framework. Short-, medium-, and long-run consequences (Priority: 5/5): The transcript traces immediate disruption, subsequent wage gains and declining serfdom, and longer-run effects on urbanization, regional development, and European institutional change. Social conflict and persecution (Priority: 3/5): The episode highlights research on anti-Jewish pogroms during the plague and the relationship between mortality severity and scapegoating. Relevance for modern pandemics (Priority: 4/5): Koyama argues the Black Death offers a cleaner long-run natural experiment than COVID or Spanish flu for understanding how pandemics interact with institutions and factor endowments.

Key Arguments: The Black Death was likely the largest proportional mortality shock in European or even world history, making it uniquely valuable for economic analysis. Mortality estimates are strongest for Western Europe; evidence is thinner for Eastern Europe and Asia, so many conclusions are regionally uneven. The plague’s spread was not simply a function of population density or city size; rural areas could be hit as hard as cities because black rats were widespread. Early exposure to the pandemic mattered more than generic trade connectivity; proximity to Sicily and the initial spread route helped determine severity. In a Malthusian framework, population collapse should raise wages and living standards for survivors because labor becomes scarcer. In a Smithian framework, the shock can damage specialization and trade, reducing economic complexity even if some incomes rise. The evidence shows real wages rose substantially after the plague, but with delay due to institutions and landlord resistance. Per capita GDP increased too, but less than real wages, suggesting both Malthusian gains and Smithian losses were at work. Serfdom weakened and eventually disappeared in England, illustrating a major institutional response to labor scarcity. Long-run effects were heterogeneous: some cities recovered quickly, others took centuries, and the Black Death may have shifted Europe’s economic center northward. The plague also intensified anti-Jewish violence in some areas, but the relationship between mortality severity and pogroms was not monotonic. For contemporary pandemic analysis, the main lesson is that outcomes depend on pre-existing institutions, demographics, and economic structure.

Data Points: Estimated mortality in Europe: about 40% - Consensus estimate for deaths from the Black Death over roughly five years Case fatality rate, bubonic plague: about 70% - Probability of death after infection with bubonic plague Case fatality rate, pneumonic plague: about 90% - Even deadlier respiratory form spread person to person COVID-19 case fatality rate: probably less than 1% - Koyama’s rough comparison to the Black Death Timing of initial spread in Europe: from 1347 onward - The Black Death spread across Europe and the Middle East after 1347 Duration of major wave: about five years - Initial spread period referenced in the introduction England’s serf share before the plague: around half of the population - Used to explain the breakdown of serfdom after the shock City mortality example: Milan: about 15% mortality in the dataset - Illustrates noisy but comparatively low mortality relative to Florence or Venice Urban recovery horizon: within about 200 years - Working paper finding on absolute city populations after the plague Institutional decline horizon: 50–70 years - Approximate period over which serfdom weakened in England Long-run demographic and institutional shift: within 100 years, basically no more serfs in England - Marks the institutional transformation following the plague European marriage pattern: later marriage in Northwest Europe - Discussed as an institution potentially strengthened after the Black Death

Pivotal Quotes: "the consensus these days is at least 40% of the population of Europe died from the Black Death over the course of about five years" — Mark Koyama: Explaining the scale of mortality relative to COVID-19 "the Black Death isn't bad for ordinary people, conditional on you surviving it" — Mark Koyama: Summarizing the Malthusian mechanism of higher wages after labor scarcity "it’s incorrect and overly simplistic to say it has one effect" — Mark Koyama: Concluding that pandemic effects depend on institutions, geography, and factor endowments

Implications: The Black Death shows pandemics can reshape wages, institutions, urban systems, and regional power, but effects vary sharply by context. For modern policy, the key lesson is that demographic shocks interact with pre-existing institutions and market structure.