Macro Musings
Macro Musings

Scott Sumner on Monetary Policy Confusion in Our Current Policy Debates

Scott Sumner is the Ralph G. Hawtrey Chair Emeritus of Monetary Policy and the founder of the Monetary Policy Program at Mercatus. Scott returns to the show, to discuss his life post Mercatus, nominal GDP counterfactuals of the pandemic and the Great Financial Crisis, the role of QE in inflation, th

Featured Speakers

David Beckworth Host

Topics Discussed

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: David Beckworth and Scott Sumner revisit Sumner’s core macro views: nominal GDP is the best guide to monetary stance, monetary policy—not fiscal policy or supply shocks—drives most macro outcomes, and central banks should use simpler regimes like nominal GDP level targeting. They also debate QE, the 2021-22 inflation surge, Fed independence, and why public inflation fears remain elevated.

Main Topics: Nominal GDP as the key macro indicator (Priority: 5/5): Sumner argues macro should be simplified around nominal GDP, which he sees as the best real-time measure of whether policy is too tight or too loose and the best lens for understanding recessions and inflation overshoots. Monetary policy versus fiscal policy and supply shocks (Priority: 5/5): He contends monetary policy is the main driver of nominal GDP, while fiscal policy and supply shocks are often overstated except in unusual cases like COVID. Pre-2008 Fed operating system versus balance-sheet complexity (Priority: 4/5): Sumner prefers the earlier small-balance-sheet Fed framework, arguing it was simpler and more reliable than the post-2008 abundant-reserves regime with interest on reserves. QE, the Great Recession, and the pandemic inflation episode (Priority: 5/5): The discussion contrasts QE1-3 as largely accommodative/liquidity-providing with QE4 as much more visibly expansionary, and debates how much inflation was caused by fiscal stimulus versus Fed excess. Nominal GDP level targeting and expectations management (Priority: 5/5): Both speakers emphasize that credible level targeting would stabilize expectations, reduce overshoots, and likely have prevented some of the extreme policy swings seen in 2008 and 2021-22. Fed independence and fiscal dominance risk (Priority: 4/5): Sumner says debt worries are real but not yet binding the Fed; if fiscal dominance emerges, the result would be high inflation and high nominal rates, not low rates. Why inflation remains politically salient (Priority: 4/5): They discuss the public’s strong anti-inflation reaction, comparing it to the 1970s and German historical memory, and note the disconnect between strong labor markets and bad inflation perceptions.

Key Arguments: Nominal GDP is the best summary statistic for macro policy because it captures both inflation and real activity and reveals whether policy has been too expansionary or contractionary. Monetary policy is the main determinant of nominal GDP growth; fiscal policy and supply shocks matter, but often less than commentators assume. The Great Recession was worsened by too-tight monetary policy in the U.S. and especially the ECB, including the ECB’s explicit rate hikes in 2008 and 2011. Interest rates alone are a misleading guide to policy because the natural rate moves; what matters is the policy rate relative to equilibrium and expected nominal spending. QE’s effects depend on macro context: it can be powerful when money is undesired, but weak when it mainly accommodates liquidity demand, especially with interest on reserves. The pandemic-era inflation was caused in Sumner’s view by excessive fiscal stimulus plus a Fed that failed to offset it; the Fed should be judged on nominal GDP outcomes. Nominal GDP level targeting would have raised expected future nominal growth, supported higher natural rates, and likely reduced the need for zero rates in 2008-09. The Fed’s 2020 average-inflation-targeting framework was good in theory but badly implemented asymmetrically, which discredited it and pushed the Fed back to inferior flexible inflation targeting. Fiscal dominance is a long-run risk, but the U.S. is not there yet; current market-based inflation expectations do not signal imminent breakdown. Public anger about inflation is rational and politically important because it constrains governments from monetizing debt and helps prevent fiscal dominance.

Data Points: Macro target for nominal GDP: About 4% annual growth - Sumner’s preferred nominal GDP level target consistent with roughly 2% inflation and high employment Long-run inflation goal: About 2% - Referenced as the desired inflation outcome under the Fed framework and in Sumner’s proposed regime Fed balance sheet composition pre-2008: About 98% currency and 2% bank deposits at the Fed - Used to illustrate the simplicity of the pre-2008 operating system Great Recession fiscal tightening: Budget deficit fell from a little over $1 trillion to a little over $500 billion - 2012 to 2013 calendar-year comparison cited by Beckworth and Sumner ECB rate hikes: Raised rates twice in 2011 - Cited as an explicit tightening that preceded the Eurozone double-dip recession U.S. recession recovery period: Recovery sped up in 2013 relative to 2012 - Attributed partly to aggressive QE and forward guidance amid fiscal austerity Pandemic inflation peak: Almost 9% in 2021-22 - Referenced as the recent inflation surge under debate Current inflation level mentioned: About 3% - Used in discussion of how the public still perceives inflation as a major problem Desired PCE inflation: About 2% - Derived from the 30-year TIPS spread discussion and Fed target 30-year TIPS spread: About 2.25% - Used as a market-based indicator implying about 2% PCE inflation expectations Unemployment rate referenced: 4.5% - Cited as part of the apparent disconnect between macro data and public sentiment 2013 deficit reduction: Almost in half - Federal budget deficit contraction highlighted as fiscal headwind to the Fed Great Recession European comparison: Far worse in the Eurozone than the U.S. - Used to argue ECB policy was tighter than Fed policy Historical inflation benchmark: 4% annual inflation in the 1980s was seen as a success - Illustrates how today’s public is more inflation-averse than earlier generations

Pivotal Quotes: "I would focus on nominal GDP as the important indicator of macro policy." — Scott Sumner: Sumner’s core framework for simplifying macroeconomics and assessing central bank stance "The most effective technique is a different policy regime, something like level targeting, where you commit to make up for previous undershoots." — Scott Sumner: On why expectations and regime design matter more than isolated interest-rate or QE moves "If the Fed continues to stick to its mandated targets, it's going to put pressure on Congress to do something at some point about fiscal." — Scott Sumner: On the limits of fiscal dominance and why credible monetary policy still matters

Implications: Listeners should take away that Sumner sees stable nominal spending, not rates or balancesheets, as the true policy anchor. The episode argues for regime-based Fed reform, warns against complacency on inflation, and suggests public inflation intolerance is a key constraint on future fiscal/monetary policy.

🔓 Sign Up for Unlimited Episode Search

About Macro Musings

Hosted by David Beckworth of the Mercatus Center, Macro Musings pulls back the curtain on the important macroeconomic issues of the past, present, and future.

View all episodes from Macro Musings