Ten Percent Less Democracy with Garett Jones

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: This episode discusses Garrett Jones’s book 10% Less Democracy, arguing that many successful democracies already rely on non-democratic institutions—like courts, central banks, bureaucracies, and party elites—and that modestly reducing direct voter control can improve long-run policy outcomes. The conversation highlights evidence that election pressure worsens policy choices and that limited epistocratic or technocratic reforms can be beneficial without sliding into authoritarianism.

Main Topics: Why 'less democracy' is not anti-democratic (Priority: 5/5): The interview frames the book as a defense of keeping some decisions away from direct voter control, noting that modern democracies already contain many non-democratic institutions that people accept because they work well. Election timing and short-term political incentives (Priority: 5/5): Jones argues that politicians behave differently when elections are near, often favoring short-term popularity over long-term policy quality, using U.S. Senate behavior and free trade votes as examples. Democracy's minimum baseline versus optimal level (Priority: 5/5): The discussion distinguishes between avoiding authoritarianism—which prevents famine and democide—and optimizing governance in rich democracies, where modest reductions in direct control may improve outcomes. Epistocracy and informed voting (Priority: 4/5): The episode explores the idea of giving more weight to informed voters or restricting participation in some institutions, while emphasizing that many countries already impose knowledge- or disability-based voting restrictions. Bondholders and long-term fiscal discipline (Priority: 4/5): Jones proposes giving bondholders more formal input because they are long-term stakeholders whose interests align with fiscal sustainability, and whose influence already exists informally through markets. Party elites, backroom bargaining, and political realism (Priority: 4/5): The conversation argues that party insiders and closed-door negotiations often improve governance by filtering populist candidates and coordinating outcomes that mass elections may not produce. Historical and comparative case for mixed government (Priority: 3/5): The episode situates the argument in a long tradition from Aristotle to the Founders, favoring a balance of democracy and oligarchy rather than pure rule by the masses.

Key Arguments: Politicians respond to election timing: as elections approach, they become more cautious and more likely to avoid unpopular but beneficial reforms. Free trade and labor-market liberalization are often delayed or diluted near elections because voters tend to dislike these policies in the short run. Very low democracy is dangerous: authoritarian regimes are associated with famines and democide; the debate is about improving rich democracies, not moving toward dictatorship. Many trusted institutions are already undemocratic, including independent courts, central banks, regulators, and bureaucracies, and these arrangements are widely accepted because they work. Epistocratic reforms need not be extreme; modest qualifications or vote-weighting could improve electorate quality without drastically changing outcomes. Bondholders already constrain governments through borrowing costs; formalizing their role could improve long-run fiscal planning. Party elites and internal party bargaining can prevent dysfunctional populist outcomes and help coordinate more capable candidates and policies. The best government is often a hybrid of democracy and oligarchy, not maximal democracy in every domain.

Data Points: Recording date: March 19, 2020 - Host opens by noting the episode was recorded during the early COVID-19 pandemic. Senate term length: 6 years - Used as an example of how longer terms reduce immediate electoral pressure on legislators. Election-timing effect on free-trade support: 10 percentage points - Study cited showing U.S. senators are more likely to support free trade deals when more than two years from election. Election proximity threshold: less than 2 years vs. more than 2 years - Defines when senators are considered 'in cycle' and behavior changes. IMF bailout example: $2 billion - Illustrative amount mentioned for an IMF crisis loan tied to reform conditions. Irish Senate university-based seats: 6 seats (10%) - Ireland reserves six of its Senate seats for graduates of its two best universities. High school graduation rate among major U.S. ethnic groups: about 90% - Used to argue a U.S. high-school diploma voting cutoff would not strongly distort the electorate at a broad ethnic-category level. Countries restricting voting for severe intellectual disability: over two dozen - European Union document cited to show that some forms of epistocratic restriction already exist in rich democracies. Bondholder consultation frequency proposed: twice a year - Suggested formal meetings between bondholder councils and finance ministries/treasury departments. Long-term bond horizon: 10 years or longer - Used to describe bondholders most likely to care about long-run fiscal health.

Pivotal Quotes: "We could easily replace most of our Supreme Court decisions with mass votes. And almost nobody wants to do this." — Garrett Jones: Illustrates the claim that modern democracies already accept non-democratic decision-making in key institutions. "I think that there's something like a democracy laugher curve, where there's an optimal level of democracy." — Garrett Jones: Jones’s central framing: democracy is beneficial up to a point, but more is not always better. "The worst thing about the smoke-filled rooms that used where all the deals used to happen is that they were filled with smoke. But other than that, a pretty good idea." — Garrett Jones: A defense of party bargaining and behind-the-scenes coordination as often functional rather than corrupt.

Implications: Listeners are encouraged to question reflexive pro-democracy rhetoric and evaluate institutions by results. The episode suggests that modest technocratic, epistocratic, and elite-mediated reforms may improve policy quality in stable democracies without threatening core freedoms.