Terrorism, Israel, and Dreams of Peace (with Haviv Rettig Gur)

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Russ Roberts and Haviv Rettig Gur trace how Israeli public opinion toward Palestinians shifted from hope in Oslo to deep skepticism after the First and Second Intifadas, Gaza disengagement, Lebanon, and October 7. Gur argues Israelis are not irrationally hawkish; they learned through repeated withdrawals and attacks that Palestinian and allied militias interpret concessions as weakness, making peace-through-withdrawal seem impossible without changing the enemy’s ideology and incentives.

Main Topics: Rejecting caricatures of Israelis and Palestinians (Priority: 5/5): Gur argues Western discourse reduces both peoples to moral cartoons, obscuring the human logic behind their actions and preventing serious understanding or policy analysis. The First Intifada and the rise of the Israeli peace left (Priority: 5/5): The First Intifada is presented as a grassroots uprising that convinced many Israelis, especially on the left, that occupation was morally unsustainable and that ending it could bring quiet. Oslo, Rabin, and the collapse of trust after suicide bombings (Priority: 5/5): Gur describes how the Oslo process and Rabin’s assassination initially strengthened the peace camp, but Hamas suicide attacks during the 1996 election and especially the Second Intifada shattered Israeli faith in the peace process. Algeria as the strategic model for Palestinian militancy (Priority: 5/5): He argues Palestinian elites, especially Hamas and parts of Fatah, were influenced by the FLN’s anti-colonial logic: inflict costs high enough to force withdrawal and provoke harsher retaliation that delegitimizes the occupier. Disengagements from Gaza and Lebanon and the deterrence lesson (Priority: 5/5): Israel’s unilateral withdrawals from South Lebanon and Gaza were followed by attacks from Hezbollah and Hamas, reinforcing the mainstream Israeli view that withdrawals create vacuums filled by militant groups. October 7 and the hardening of the Israeli mainstream (Priority: 5/5): Gur treats October 7 as a continuation of the same strategic logic and says it further entrenched Israeli belief that Palestinian armed groups cannot be trusted to reciprocate concessions. The Israel-Diaspora Jewish divide (Priority: 4/5): He closes by contrasting American Jewish liberal experience with Israeli Jewish history of exclusion, war, and survival, arguing this gap shapes divergent views of Zionism and anti-Zionism.

Key Arguments: Israeli mistrust of Palestinian intentions is rooted in lived experience, not ignorance or prejudice; repeated attempts at negotiation and withdrawal were followed by violence. The First Intifada convinced many Israelis the occupation was morally unsustainable, but the Second Intifada convinced them that withdrawal itself could invite mass murder. Hamas and other militant groups are not acting randomly or out of pure desperation; they follow a coherent redemptive/anti-colonial strategy modeled on Algeria. The Israeli left did not disappear; it became politically marginalized because the peace narrative it embraced could not explain the Second Intifada or the failure of Gaza/Lebanon withdrawals. Unilateral withdrawal is seen by most Israelis as dangerous in the West Bank because it is strategically closer to Israel’s population centers than Gaza or Lebanon. International pressure has limited effect because Israelis believe external critics do not face the consequences they do, while armed adversaries remain committed to violence. The core Israeli lesson after 2006 and especially 2023 is that enemies who interpret restraint as weakness must be deterred by force, not persuaded by moral appeals. American Jews and Israeli Jews inhabit different historical memories: American Jews experienced liberal inclusion, while Israeli Jews experienced exclusion, statelessness, and the necessity of sovereign self-defense.

Data Points: Year of First Intifada: 1987 - Gur identifies this as the uprising that reshaped Israeli left-wing thinking about occupation and peace. Year of Oslo I: 1993 - Rabin and Arafat sign the Declaration of Principles that launches the peace process. Year of Oslo II: 1995 - Creates the Palestinian Authority and sets a five-year framework for final-status issues. Rabin assassination: November 1995 - An Israeli Jew kills Rabin in protest of the peace process. Israeli election turnaround: ~30,000 votes - Netanyahu defeats Peres in 1996 by a very narrow margin after Hamas suicide bombings. Second Intifada suicide bombings: 140 - Gur uses this figure to describe the scale of attacks in Israeli cities over three years. Israeli voter turnout before 2001: ~78%-84% - He says turnout was consistently high for decades before collapsing after the Second Intifada. Israeli voter turnout in 2001: 62% - He cites a dramatic drop of 17 points from the 1999 election. Voter turnout after 2001: ~63%-71% range - He says turnout never returned to its former pre-2001 level. Gaza disengagement: 2005 - Sharon removes Israeli soldiers and settlers from Gaza unilaterally. Olmert election: 2006 - Olmert wins while openly discussing further unilateral withdrawals from the West Bank. Hezbollah cross-border attack: July 12, 2006 - Leads to the Second Lebanon War and reinforces Israeli fears about withdrawals. Gazan tunnel network: 500 kilometers - Gur says Hamas built an extensive tunnel system over 17 years using much of Gaza’s economy. Western aid to Gaza: billions of dollars - He says aid was diverted from civilian infrastructure to tunnels and military buildout. October 7 attack scale: 1,200 killed / 250 kidnapped - He references the Hamas attack as a major shock deepening Israeli resolve. Israel’s width without the West Bank: 9 miles - Used to explain why the West Bank is viewed as strategically existential. France in Algeria: 124 years - He cites French colonial presence as the backdrop for the FLN model. French settlers in Algeria: about 1.5 million - Illustrates the size and permanence of the colonial population. Algerian Muslim population: 5-6 million - Used to contrast the colonized majority with the French settler minority. DP camp survey response: 90% wrote 'Palestina' - Earl Harrison’s postwar displaced-person survey illustrating Jewish desire for refuge in Palestine. Alternative response to 'Other than Palestine': 25% wrote 'crematorium' - Used to dramatize the absence of safe alternatives for Holocaust survivors.

Pivotal Quotes: "The reason Israelis can't reach a peace with the Palestinians is because they know more than the Western critic, not less." — Haviv Redegur: On why Israeli skepticism is rooted in experience rather than irrational hardline politics. "The second intifada was... a planned organized guerrilla warfare project... saying, We've just gotten the signal, now we double down." — Haviv Redegur: Explaining the Algerian anti-colonial logic he believes guided Palestinian militant strategy. "For an Israeli, living on our sword is redemption. We stopped dying when we started having the great and profound right that our ancestors never had." — Haviv Redegur: On the existential meaning of Israeli sovereignty and the psychological basis of deterrence.

Implications: The discussion suggests that any future settlement must change militant incentives and narratives, not just borders. Without a credible shift in Palestinian strategy and regional power balances, most Israelis will continue to reject withdrawals and trust deterrence over peace talks.