Episode Summary
Executive Summary: The episode examines the Saudi-Iran rapprochement as a sign of a more multipolar Middle East, arguing that Saudi economic heft, regional fragmentation, and U.S. decline are giving regional powers more room to reshape diplomacy. Toos sees de-escalation as tied less to ideology or trade than to Saudi Vision 2030, foreign investment needs, and a search for strategic flexibility amid shifting global power.
Main Topics: Saudi Arabia’s economic leverage and autonomy (Priority: 5/5): Toos argues Saudi Arabia’s oil-centered economy gives it outsized global influence despite dependence on exports, because oil production is highly concentrated in state-owned Aramco and tied to large reserves and petrodollar flows. Iran-Saudi rapprochement and regional realignment (Priority: 5/5): The discussion frames the reopening of diplomatic missions as a watershed that could reshape alliances, reduce conflict, and open room for Saudi Arabia to diversify its regional partnerships beyond the Abraham Accords. Limits of trade and diplomacy in changing ideology (Priority: 4/5): The hosts question whether deeper economic ties can meaningfully soften long-standing Sunni-Shia and geopolitical rivalries, concluding that commerce alone has rarely transformed political and ideological positions. Saudi Vision 2030 as a driver of de-escalation (Priority: 5/5): Toos suggests regional peace efforts are motivated by Saudi Arabia’s need to make its modernization and diversification agenda more credible to investors rather than by economics naturally producing reconciliation. Conflict spillovers in Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Lebanon (Priority: 4/5): The episode distinguishes between conflicts fundamentally shaped by the Iran-Saudi rivalry and those driven more by local dynamics, noting that the rivalry can intensify existing fractures but is not always the root cause. Multipolarity and declining U.S. dominance (Priority: 5/5): The conversation situates the rapprochement within a broader shift away from U.S.-led regional order toward a more plural system where China, Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states, and Iran all exert independent influence.
Key Arguments: Saudi Arabia is not fully independent, but its oil exports, OPEC+ role, and Aramco-centered state structure give it far more leverage than most states. A concentrated, state-owned export model can create political strength by reducing internal coordination problems and aligning national resources with state strategy. The Saudi-Iran rapprochement is driven less by ideological convergence than by Saudi Arabia seeking flexibility amid U.S. rigidity and changing global alignments. Trade and security ties have historically not eliminated deep ideological divides, so rapprochement should be seen as de-escalation rather than reconciliation. Saudi Vision 2030 is under credibility pressure, and regional calm would help attract investment and make the transformation narrative more believable. Some regional conflicts, like Yemen, are heavily shaped by the Saudi-Iran rivalry; others, like Sudan, are driven mainly by local grievances even if external powers later intervene. The Middle East is increasingly structured by multipolarity, not simple alignment or subordination to Washington or Beijing, though superpowers still help shape the field of play.
Data Points: Oil exports: 10 million barrels per day - Saudi Arabia’s daily oil exports cited as the basis of its leverage. Share of global seaborne oil exports: 17-18% - Saudi Arabia’s approximate share of total seaborne oil exports. Saudi reserve assets: $450 billion - Value of Saudi reserves described as a source of security and influence. Saudi diplomatic reopening date: May 9 - The date when Iran and Saudi Arabia were supposed to reopen diplomatic missions in each other’s countries. Saudi Vision 2030: 2030 - Referenced as the modernization agenda whose credibility depends partly on regional de-escalation. Sudan regime takeover: 1989 - Year the Sudanese Islamist regime came to power and was later linked to Iranian support. South Sudan secession: 2011 - Year South Sudan broke away, depriving Khartoum of oil revenue and weakening its position. Sudan’s shift toward Gulf alignment: 2014-2017 - Period when Sudan moved from the Iranian camp toward the Saudi-Emirati axis.
Pivotal Quotes: "Saudi is not in the position of a desperate borrower that needs access to global credit." — Adam Toos: Explaining why Saudi Arabia has room to act independently and why oil revenue strengthens its geopolitical position. "What we're seeing is the Saudis, as you say, exploring their options." — Adam Toos: Describing Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic flexibility as global power balances shift and China becomes more active in the region. "I don't think either the maybe the alignment issue, but certainly the subordination term is really an unhelpful way of thinking about the current situation." — Adam Toos: Arguing that the Middle East is better understood through multipolarity than through simple dependency on outside powers.
Implications: Listeners should view the Iran-Saudi thaw as a strategic adjustment within a multipolar region, not a guaranteed peace deal. Saudi Arabia’s domestic reform agenda, regional conflicts, and shifting U.S.-China dynamics will determine whether the détente endures.
About Ones and Tooze
Foreign Policy economics columnist Adam Tooze, a history professor and a popular author, is encyclopedic about basically everything: from the COVID shutdown, to climate change, to pasta sauce. On our new podcast, Tooze and FP deputy editor Cameron Abadi will look at two data points each week that explain the world: one drawn from the week’s headlines and the other from just about anywhere else Tooze takes us. Check out Adam Tooze’s column at https://foreignpolicy.com/author/adam-tooze/.