Capitalisnt
Capitalisnt

When a Few Financial Institutions Control Everything, with John Coates

In his recent book, "The Problem of Twelve: When a Few Financial Institutions Control Everything," Harvard law professor John Coates sheds light on the secrecy, lack of public accountability, concentrated power, and the disproportionate influence of a select few institutions in our financi

Featured Speakers

University of Chicago Podcast Network HostJohn Coates GuestBethany McLean Guest

Topics Discussed

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Bethany McLean, Luigi Zingales, and John Coates debate the rise of private equity and index funds as concentrated sources of economic and political power. They argue that secrecy, scale, and weak disclosure create a democratic deficit for capitalism, while solutions center on transparency, pass-through voting, and stronger oversight—especially in private equity and pensions.

Main Topics: Concentration of economic power in index funds and private equity (Priority: 5/5): Coates frames the core issue as a small number of asset managers controlling a large share of corporate equity and non-public equity, creating a legitimacy problem for capitalism even when individual products are efficient. Private equity’s opacity and legitimacy problem (Priority: 5/5): McLean and Zingales criticize private equity for secrecy, dividend recapitalizations, and the use of leverage to extract cash rather than build businesses, arguing that the industry’s public impact is far larger than its 'private' label suggests. Political power vs. market power (Priority: 5/5): The conversation distinguishes market power from political power: concentrated owners can determine proxy fights, influence disclosure debates, shape corporate governance, and affect policy indirectly through voting blocs. Pass-through voting and investor democracy (Priority: 4/5): A major solution discussed is giving ultimate investors more direct control over index-fund voting via guidelines, investor assemblies, or pass-through systems, though implementation is complex and costly. Regulation, disclosure, and antitrust (Priority: 4/5): The speakers argue that the U.S. should require more disclosure for private markets and rethink antitrust to address conglomerate-like structures and cross-market power, especially in sectors like health care. Public vs. private markets and incentives (Priority: 4/5): Zingales argues that the disclosure gap between public and private markets distorts capital allocation and encourages firms to stay private, while Coates notes that the private market structure undercuts public accountability. Healthcare, pensions, and consumer harm (Priority: 4/5): Private equity’s strongest risks are said to appear in regulated or hard-to-regulate sectors such as medical services, where leverage and incentives may push harm onto patients, workers, and pension beneficiaries.

Key Arguments: Index funds and private equity are not just financial products; their scale creates power over corporations and the broader economy, which can undermine democratic legitimacy. Private equity’s secrecy prevents outsiders from knowing its true returns, risk-adjusted performance, leverage, and governance practices, harming capital allocation. Dividend recapitalizations exemplify private equity extracting value through debt and payouts rather than investing in long-term business health. Index fund voting can be outcome-determinative in major corporate fights, turning a few fund managers into quasi-political actors without public accountability. Pass-through voting is desirable in principle, but current technology, complexity, fiduciary duties, and low retail participation make full implementation difficult. Disclosure should be expanded in private markets because the public-private regulatory gap distorts firm behavior and pushes activity into less transparent spaces. Private equity is especially problematic in healthcare and other sectors where law and professional norms are weak or easy to override. Antitrust doctrine should evolve to address conglomerate-style market power and tacit collusion across multiple markets, not just narrow consumer price effects. Political pressure has been more effective on index funds than private equity; private equity has largely avoided sustained bipartisan scrutiny despite growing influence. Pension funds are a promising regulatory lever because they are politically defensible to oversee and often not sophisticated enough to monitor private-equity strategies well.

Data Points: Index fund voting control: 20% to over 30% - Coates says index funds control this share of votes in American corporations. Private equity share of non-public equity: about 25% - Coates estimates private equity controls roughly a quarter of non-public equity. Number of decision-makers: less than a dozen - He argues fewer than 12 people across these industries control a very large portion of U.S. equity. Private equity growth in assets under management: $770 billion to $12.1 trillion - McLean cites Coates on private equity’s rise in global AUM over roughly two decades. Private equity growth relative to U.S. economy: 4 to 5 times faster - Used to show how unusually fast the industry expanded compared with the broader economy. Bankruptcy likelihood: 10 times more likely - Bethany cites a study saying private companies bought by PE are about 10x more likely to go bankrupt than those that are not. FTC case example: Walsh, Carson and Anderson roll-up of anesthesia partners in Texas - Used as an illustration of PE-driven roll-ups creating market power and surprise billing risks. SEC rulemaking challenge: 5th Circuit lawsuit - Coates notes PE/hedge/VC trade groups sued recent SEC private-fund disclosure rules in the Fifth Circuit. Campaign spending benchmark: $2 billion - Coates says $100 million is not enough to elect a president in today’s environment. Private equity lobbying issue: carried interest taxed at capital gains rates - Discussed as a major example of bipartisan lobbying success by PE.

Pivotal Quotes: "When you have that small number of people controlling this big a portion of the economy, there's always a risk that they will do things that are in their own interest or at a minimum just not in the interest of the public at large." — John Coates: Central thesis about concentrated financial power and democratic deficit. "The other side of the problem is when you have that small number of people controlling this big a portion of the economy, there's always a risk that they will do things in their own interest... That's a real democratic deficit for capitalism to be perceived as being oligarchic in that way." — John Coates: Explains why concentration is a legitimacy issue, not only a market issue. "The only thing that's private about this business is that it's very secretive." — Bethany McLean: Summarizes the critique that private equity is not meaningfully private in ownership or impact.

Implications: The episode suggests capitalism’s legitimacy now depends on transparency, accountable voting, and tougher oversight of concentrated financial actors. Without reform, private equity and index funds may keep shaping policy and markets with too little public scrutiny.

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About Capitalisnt

Is capitalism the engine of destruction or the engine of prosperity? On this podcast we talk about the ways capitalism is—or more often isn’t—working in our world today. Hosted by Vanity Fair contributing editor, Bethany McLean and world renowned economics professor Luigi Zingales, we explain how capitalism can go wrong, and what we can do to fix it. Cover photo attributions: https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/about/capitalisnt. If you would like to send us feedback, suggestions fo...

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