Here’s How an Open Democratic Convention Would Work

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: Ezra Klein and Elaine Kamarck examine how U.S. presidential nominations work, why the post-1968 primary system replaced open conventions, and what would happen if Democrats had to choose a nominee at the convention this year. Kamarck argues an open convention would favor broadly acceptable, politically experienced candidates and could still be orderly, even if media coverage made it look chaotic.

Main Topics: How nominations work as a process (Priority: 5/5): Kamarck explains that nominating a president is a sequence of state contests that allocate delegates over months, not a single election. Primaries and caucuses are only one step toward the convention. Why 1968 changed the system (Priority: 5/5): The disastrous 1968 Democratic Convention and anti-war unrest led to reforms making primaries binding and caucuses synchronized, shifting power from party elites to voters. Democracy: direct vs representative (Priority: 4/5): The conversation contrasts direct participation in primaries with representative decision-making by delegates, party officials, and elected leaders who are themselves accountable to voters. What an open convention in 2024 could look like (Priority: 5/5): If Biden exited before the convention, state conventions, county conventions, and delegate-whipping would reemerge, with candidates competing for activist support and delegate slates. Who benefits from convention politics (Priority: 4/5): Kamarck argues conventions tend to reward candidates who are acceptable to a broad coalition and have deep political relationships, rather than insurgents or media-first personalities. Legitimacy, money, and media in a modern convention (Priority: 4/5): The speakers discuss whether a convention decision would feel legitimate to voters, how parties could finance a late-start nominee, and how intense media coverage would shape public perception. Party conflict and possible fault lines (Priority: 3/5): They note Democrats appear more unified than Republicans, but issues like Israel-Palestine could still create friction if the nomination fight became prolonged or ideological.

Key Arguments: The modern nominating system is a sequence of elections: primaries allocate delegates, but delegates are chosen later and the convention formally selects the nominee. Before 1972, most primaries were 'beauty contests' that provided information but did not bind delegates; winning a primary did not necessarily mean winning delegates. The McGovern-Fraser reforms made primaries binding and synchronized caucuses, unintentionally transferring real nomination power from party leaders to primary voters. Delegates and party leaders are not anti-democratic in the same way primaries are often framed; they are usually themselves elected representatives or party actors with accountability. An open convention would encourage candidates to build grassroots delegate support through state and county conventions rather than through mass primary campaigns. This process tends to filter for candidates with broad coalition appeal, governing competence, and relationships across the party, while disadvantaging insurgent or novelty candidates. Kamarck argues that a convention process includes a form of 'peer review'—party insiders and elected officials assessing whether a person can actually govern. Ezra challenges the idealized view, noting that old convention politics also involved ideology, power, bias, and strategic horse-trading—not just competence. If Biden exited close to the convention, delegates would likely need multiple ballots, hotel-room lobbying, and visible media campaigns to settle on a nominee. Kamarck believes Democratic conflict would likely remain manageable because the time window is short and the party is more unified than Republicans, though she acknowledges uncertainty. Money would not necessarily be the main barrier after a convention, because party apparatus and funds can be transferred to the nominee and used nationally. Legitimacy concerns could be eased by the reality that the country could not rerun all 50 primaries; parties would be forced into a fallback process to meet the election deadline.

Data Points: Number of primaries in 1968: about 16 - Kamarck explains that very few primaries existed then, and most were non-binding. Democratic convention delegates in a late open-convention scenario: 4,000+ - Ezra and Kamarck discuss the scale of delegates who would arrive in Chicago if Biden withdrew after delegates were selected. Votes/ballots in the 1912 convention: 46 ballots - Ezra cites the Woodrow Wilson convention as an example of prolonged deadlock. Support threshold in polls: two-thirds - Ezra references a CNN poll showing roughly two-thirds of Democratic-leaning voters did not want Biden to run again. Example of delayed caucus timing: 2 or 3 weeks - Kamarck says Iowa caucuses used to be spread over weeks before reform required same-day voting. Date range for state convention selection process: April, May, and June - Kamarck says if Biden dropped out in April, delegate selection would proceed through spring and early summer. Biden fundraising balance: more than $100 million on hand - Ezra raises the issue of campaign funds and notes Biden had substantial cash available. Republican party financial weakness mentioned: 4 swing-state parties out of money - Kamarck says GOP organizational chaos would make late-cycle nomination problems harder for Republicans.

Pivotal Quotes: "Selecting a nominee is a process, not an event." — Elaine Kamark: Kamarck frames the entire nomination system as sequential rather than one-off. "This is a people's nomination." — George McGovern: Ezra quotes McGovern to illustrate the shift toward primary-driven legitimacy after 1972. "The modern primary system is devoid of peer review." — Elaine Kamark: Kamarck argues that conventions allow experienced party actors to assess candidate competence.

Implications: If Biden exits late, Democrats could still nominate via a convention, but the process would be media-saturated and highly consequential. It would likely reward coalition-builders over insurgents and test whether voters still accept party-led legitimacy.