Odd Lots
Odd Lots

Rory Johnston on Why His $200 Oil Prediction Didn't Turn Out Right

The Strait of Hormuz has (mostly) re-opened! Crude prices are still up since the start of the war with Iran, but popular predictions earlier this year of $200-a-barrel Brent didn’t pan out. Why is that? We last talked to Rory Johnston, the founder of the Commodity Context newsletter, at the start of

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Bloomberg HostRory Johnston Guest

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Episode Summary

Executive Summary: The episode revisits the oil market’s reaction to the Hormuz disruption and why Brent never reached the feared $150-$200 range. Rory Johnston argues the shock was absorbed by a combination of Chinese import cuts, strategic stock releases, and market behavior changes, especially trader risk reduction and jawboning. The conversation centers on what China did, why, and what it means for future oil balances and prices.

Main Topics: Hormuz shock vs. market outcome (Priority: 5/5): The hosts and Rory contrast early doomsday pricing forecasts with the reality that Brent stayed far below expectations despite the Strait of Hormuz closure and major physical disruption. China as the key swing factor (Priority: 5/5): Rory argues China’s sharp reduction in crude imports was the biggest reason the market did not spike further, absorbing much of the lost Gulf supply and easing competition for barrels across Asia. Demand destruction, stockpiles, and substitution in China (Priority: 5/5): The discussion explores whether China’s import drop reflected real demand weakness, strategic reserve releases, refined product draws, or substitution toward gas/coal feedstocks and EVs. Strategic petroleum reserves and inventory dynamics (Priority: 4/5): The episode distinguishes strategic stocks from commercial inventories, arguing that SPR releases act like supply and can cushion shocks, but rebuilding them may support demand later only if markets loosen. Trader behavior, risk limits, and jawboning (Priority: 4/5): Rory says repeated policy headlines and volatility reduced trader appetite, with many bullish models but little buying because risk limits were slashed after early blowups. Why the oil market proved more resilient than expected (Priority: 4/5): The conversation reflects on how existing surplus, rerouting capacity, and market adaptation made the oil system more flexible than analysts assumed before the crisis.

Key Arguments: The Hormuz closure was the largest supply disruption in market history, but rerouting, strategic releases, and demand-side adjustments prevented the feared price spike. China likely absorbed a huge share of the shock by cutting imports by roughly 5-6 million barrels/day, relieving pressure on Asian buyers. It is unclear how much of China’s import decline was actual demand destruction versus releases from hidden inventories or refined-product stocks. China’s EV penetration is too small in fleet terms to explain a sudden multi-million-barrel/day drop in oil demand. Strategic reserves should be treated as discretionary supply, not just inventory; they can materially affect market balance and prices. Trader behavior mattered: repeated shocks, jawboning, and depleted risk limits kept bullish price action from fully taking hold. If inventories had been drawn down further or the disruption lasted longer, prices could still have surged sharply; the outcome was not predetermined. Rebuilding SPRs may create medium-term demand support, but only if the market first returns to a looser or surplus condition.

Data Points: Brent crude price: Below $74/bbl - Mentioned on June 24 during the discussion of the post-crisis oil market Brent peak during crisis: Just shy of $120/bbl - Two crisis peaks occurred at the end of March and end of April Total flow through Hormuz before war: ~20 million barrels/day - Baseline throughput cited by Rory Net Gulf oil production shut in: ~13 million barrels/day - After accounting for rerouting options and offsets Share of global supply disrupted: 13%+ - Rory characterizes the shut-in volume as over 13% of global supply China crude import decline: Upwards of 5 million barrels/day - Drop versus the three-month average prior to the war through June China import decline including products: 5-6 million barrels/day - Crude plus products estimate discussed in the China section Asia spot market supply hit: Upwards of half - China’s drop absorbed around half of the total spot market supply hit to Asia China’s crude refining run-rate decline: 3 to 3.5 million barrels/day - Domestic refining activity fell sharply alongside import changes Chinese oil stock estimate: Upwards of a billion barrels - Rory references large refined product stockpiles that are hard to observe directly China SPR cavern capacity: At least 131 million barrels - Six storage caverns known to exist Chinese import reduction over crisis period: 400-500 million barrels - Relative to the three months before the war IEA SPR release upper end: ~400 million barrels - Used for comparison against China’s cumulative demand swing Oil trapped in Hormuz: Well over 100 million barrels - Floating inventory stuck in transit during the closure Cumulative shut-in volume to date: ~1.3 billion barrels - Total volume not produced across the crisis period Brent at start of year: ~$60/bbl - Used to show the pre-war baseline Brent on eve of war: ~$70/bbl - Shows some premium was already priced in Petrol price in Beijing: ~30% increase - Compared with global doubling, suggesting domestic price controls dampened demand response Global gasoline/diesel/jet stocks in China: Large, but unverified - Rory notes these refined-product inventories are hard to track New energy vehicle sales share in China: 60%+ of new sales - Yet fleet composition remains overwhelmingly ICE vehicles China vehicle fleet composition: 10:1 ICE to EVs - Used to argue EV adoption alone cannot explain the demand swing Prompt Brent time spread: Flipped into contango - A sign of ample supply and weak nearby demand during the discussion US SPR/other SPR rebuild horizon: 1-3 years - Potential medium-term demand support from restocking

Pivotal Quotes: "A poor decision is always better than no decision." — Francine Lacroix: Promo for the new Leaders podcast at the very start of the transcript "Everyone's bullish, but no one's buying." — Rory Johnston: Describing trader sentiment after repeated losses and tighter risk limits "This is not supply responding to price. It's inventory responding to price." — Jeff Curry (referenced by Tracy): Used to frame the role of stockpiles and SPR releases in stabilizing the market

Implications: The episode suggests oil prices can be cushioned far more than analysts expect when major consumers like China alter imports and stocks are available. Future spikes still matter, but inventory, policy, and trader positioning may delay or blunt them.

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About Odd Lots

Bloomberg's Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway analyze the weird patterns, the complex issues and the newest market crazes. Join the conversation every Tuesday and Thursday for interviews with the most interesting minds in finance, economics and markets.

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