Selects: Project Azorian: The CIA's Super 70s Mission To Steal A Sunken Soviet Sub

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: The episode centers on Stuff You Should Know’s deep dive into Project Azorian, the CIA’s covert 1970s attempt to recover a sunken Soviet nuclear submarine using Howard Hughes’s Glomar Explorer. The hosts trace the plan’s engineering audacity, Cold War stakes, intelligence goals, partial success, and the accidental public exposure that produced the famous “neither confirm nor deny” response.

Main Topics: The sinking of the Soviet submarine K-129 (Priority: 5/5): A Soviet Golf II nuclear submarine exploded and sank in the Pacific in 1968, killing its 98-person crew and settling more than three miles underwater, creating the recovery opportunity. CIA planning and engineering of Project Azorian (Priority: 5/5): The CIA assembled engineers and contractors to design a complex covert recovery system involving the Glomar Explorer, a capture vehicle, and a submersible barge with a hidden moon pool. Howard Hughes as a cover story and contractor (Priority: 4/5): Howard Hughes and Global Marine were used as the public-facing explanation for the massive ship, framed as deep-sea manganese mining to conceal the CIA operation. The recovery attempt and partial failure (Priority: 5/5): The Glomar Explorer successfully reached and grappled the sub, but the sub broke apart during lifting, leaving most of the target and intelligence material on the seafloor. Public exposure and the origin of the 'Glomar response' (Priority: 5/5): Leaks, reporting by Seymour Hersh and others, and the LA Times disclosure pushed the story into public view, leading to the CIA’s famous refusal to confirm or deny the program. Aftermath, Soviet reaction, and historical significance (Priority: 4/5): The Soviet Union largely stayed silent to avoid embarrassment, and the episode closes by noting the operation’s enormous cost and the later repurposing of the ship.

Key Arguments: Project Azorian was one of the most ambitious covert engineering feats of the Cold War, designed to recover Soviet military and cryptographic intelligence from extreme ocean depth. The operation depended on secrecy so elaborate that the CIA had to hide the recovery vehicle inside a submersible barge and use a cover story about Howard Hughes mining manganese. The recovery was only partially successful: the sub broke apart under stress, so the CIA did not obtain the main intelligence payload it wanted. Even a failed or partial recovery could have yielded valuable information, including one-day snapshots of Soviet submarine codes and hardware. The program’s exposure mattered as much as its technical outcome because it established the enduring 'we can neither confirm nor deny' stance. Soviet silence after the leak was likely driven by embarrassment over the lost submarine and the public revelation that the U.S. had located it first.

Data Points: Year of submarine sinking: 1968 - The Soviet submarine K-129 sank during a patrol mission in the Pacific. Crew size: 98 - All 98 crew members reportedly died when K-129 sank. Depth of wreck: 16,000 feet - The submarine came to rest more than three miles below the surface. Approximate distance from Hawaii: 1,500-1,600 miles northwest - The wreck was in the northwest Pacific, far from Hawaii. Length of submarine: 300 feet - The K-129 was described as a 300-foot submarine. Weight of submarine: 2,500 tons - Engineers estimated the vessel’s mass as part of the lifting challenge. Ship length: 618 feet - The Hughes Glomar Explorer was built as a massive recovery platform. Cost in today's money: about $3 billion - The operation’s total cost is cited in the episode’s conclusion. Ship sale price: $15 million - The Glomar Explorer was later sold to a private company for scrap/repurposing. Recovery confidence estimate: 40% - A memo reportedly estimated only a 40% chance of success, yet the project moved forward. Body capacity on ship: 100 - The ship was outfitted to handle the remains of up to 100 bodies, partly as a Geneva Convention precaution. Bodies actually recovered: 6 - The team recovered the remains of six Soviet submariners. Project launch date: June 5, 1974 - The project was approved shortly before the ship departed. Ship departure date: June 15, 1974 - The Hughes Glomar Explorer left port for the recovery mission. Public leak date: February 7, 1970 - The LA Times published an early report that helped expose the story. Duration of Soviet surveillance: 14 days - Soviet ships monitored the Glomar Explorer continuously for the first two weeks.

Pivotal Quotes: "Imagine standing atop the Empire State Building with an eight-foot-wide grappling hook. On a one-inch diameter steel rope. Your task is to lower the hook to the street below, snag a compact car full of gold, and lift the car back to the top of the building. And on top of that, the job has to be done without anyone noticing." — CIA quoted in transcript: Used to illustrate the extreme difficulty and secrecy of the recovery mission. "We can neither confirm nor deny its existence" — CIA / Glomar response: Referenced as the famous answer that emerged from public questioning about the operation. "There are bodies down there." — CIA memo referenced by the hosts: Explains why the ship was equipped to recover and respectfully handle the remains of Soviet sailors.

Implications: The story shows how Cold War intelligence pushed engineering, secrecy, and political cover stories to extremes. It also explains why the Glomar response became a lasting template for government secrecy and non-answers.