The Company That Wants To Bring Back Supersonic Jet Travel

Episode Summary

Executive Summary: The episode centers on Boom Supersonic founder Blake Scholl’s case that commercial supersonic flight can be profitable if built with modern materials, software, and a vertically integrated manufacturing model. He argues Concorde failed because it was centrally planned, too small, too expensive, and blocked by the U.S. supersonic ban, while Boom’s 64-seat approach targets business-class economics, existing airline networks, and lower costs through custom engines, composites, and fast iteration.

Main Topics: Why Concorde failed and what Boom says is different (Priority: 5/5): Scholl argues Concorde’s economics were broken by government planning, excessive seat costs, and the lack of a market-based rollout path for smaller premium supersonic aircraft. Boom’s business model and airline partnerships (Priority: 5/5): Boom aims to sell a faster premium product into existing airline networks, starting with business-class travelers and supported by orders/deposits from United, American, and Japan Airlines. Manufacturing strategy: vertical integration and speed (Priority: 5/5): The conversation emphasizes in-house production, small elite teams, software-driven design, AI, and reduced iteration time as the keys to lowering cost and accelerating development. Custom engines and technical improvements (Priority: 4/5): Boom decided to develop its own Symphony engine because off-the-shelf options were unsuitable; modern materials, aerodynamics, and computational tools make the aircraft more feasible than Concorde-era technology. Regulation and U.S. industrial barriers (Priority: 4/5): The hosts and Scholl discuss the supersonic overland ban, FAA collaboration, and broader U.S. permitting/red tape as major obstacles to advanced manufacturing and aerospace innovation. Market demand for speed vs comfort (Priority: 4/5): The episode debates whether travelers and airlines will trade lie-flat comfort for time savings; Scholl argues speed creates enough value to win over premium passengers and generate more airline profit. Broader lessons for American manufacturing (Priority: 3/5): The discussion extends beyond aviation to argue that political incentives, diffuse supply chains, and risk-averse regulation undermine U.S. industrial competitiveness across sectors.

Key Arguments: Concorde failed because it was designed top-down, with 100 seats and ~$20,000 inflation-adjusted fares, making it impossible to fill profitably at scale. Supersonic travel should have started as a small, premium private-jet-like product and then scaled down in price and up in size over time, but the U.S. overland supersonic ban froze that path. Boom’s model is to fit into existing airline networks rather than replace them, letting passengers keep status, miles, and connections while flying much faster. A 60-80 seat aircraft, especially around 64 seats, is sized to match business-class demand and airline economics rather than luxury novelty. Boom claims it can be much more capital efficient than legacy aerospace by using small elite teams, software tools, AI, and vertical integration. The company says building its own engine is cheaper and faster than adapting a legacy engine, while enabling performance features like boomless cruise. Traditional aerospace supply chains are slowed by geographic fragmentation and defense-driven political incentives, so bringing more production in-house can reduce both cost and lead time. Boom says collaboration with the FAA from the earliest design stages has avoided delays and built trust, unlike Boeing’s more adversarial delegated-certification model. Modern aviation materials and tools—carbon composites, better turbofans, stronger superalloys, and digital wind tunnels—make a commercial supersonic airplane more realistic today. Boom argues airlines will favor the product because supersonic service can be more profitable than premium subsonic service, even at lower fares, due to higher aircraft utilization and speed dividend effects.

Data Points: Stock Movers report length: five minutes or less - Promo for Bloomberg’s new audio stock report Concorde commercial era: Started in the 1960s/1970s; stopped flying in the early 2000s - Hosts discuss supersonic aviation history U.S. supersonic ban: 1973 - Scholl says the U.S. banned supersonic flight over land in 1973 Boom XB1 development cost: less than $200 million - Scholl says this includes the airplane and flight test program Total capital raised by Boom: a bit over $600 million - Scholl gives company funding history Expected total capital to finish program: between $1 billion and $3 billion - Scholl estimates remaining funding needs Target first passenger service: by the end of 2029 - Boom’s stated schedule Factory size: almost 200,000 square feet - Greensboro, North Carolina factory Factory permit time: about 18 months - Scholl cites permitting delay for the North Carolina factory FAA approval timing on XB1: 90 minutes - Scholl says paperwork was handed over quickly after early FAA engagement Typical R&D airplane approval timing: 90 days - Compared with Boom’s XB1 approval process Engine blade quote from traditional supply chain: $1 million and six months - Scholl describes quoted cost/time for one engine’s worth of turbine blades Actual blade manufacturing time: 24 hours - Scholl says the physical blade-making step is fast once machinery is available Supply-chain lead time for blades: 180 days - Delay from ordering through aerospace supply chain 3D printer cost for blade production: about $2 million - Boom bought the machine instead of outsourcing Cost reduction versus big engine suppliers: about 4X - Scholl says Boom’s in-house engine plan was cheaper Projected efficiency gains vs Concorde: about 20% aerodynamic efficiency improvement and about 20% engine efficiency improvement - Scholl attributes gains to materials, aerodynamics, engines, and software Passenger research: 87% - Boom says this share of international first/business flyers would switch airlines for supersonic flights Break-even fare on New York–London example: about $3,500 round trip at 80% seat fill - Scholl gives a route economics example Typical premium-fare comparison: $5,000 or more - Compared with current business-class pricing Seat count on Concorde: 100 seats - Scholl contrasts Concorde’s capacity with Boom’s target Seat count target for Overture: 60 to 80 seats, sweet spot around 64 - Boom’s proposed commercial configuration Boomless cruise demonstration: achieved on XB1 - Scholl says Boom proved this capability during testing Time to build next airliner test flight: about three years out - Scholl estimates timeline for the next test flight

Pivotal Quotes: "I think Concorde killed supersonic flight. I think Apollo killed space exploration." — Blake Scholl: Scholl argues that prestige-driven, centrally planned programs distorted innovation "We’re going to start focused on people who’d fly first year business class today, which is somewhere like 80% of international airline profits." — Blake Scholl: Explaining Boom’s premium-market go-to-market strategy "By going faster, a bunch of costs can actually come down." — Blake Scholl: Describing the ‘speed dividend’ and why supersonic can be economically compelling

Implications: If Boom is right, supersonic air travel could return as a premium-but-profitable product, reshaping long-haul competition and exposing how regulation and fragmented supply chains slow U.S. industry. If not, the episode still highlights the challenge of turning deep tech into scalable manufacturing.