The Michael Shermer Show
The Michael Shermer Show

Why Good People Disagree About Right and Wrong

Why do reasonable people disagree so strongly about right and wrong? And why are we so quick to assume that people on the other side of a moral or political issue are irrational, selfish, ignorant, or simply bad? Michael Shermer speaks with Cornell psychologist Audun Dahl, author of Between Fixed an

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Episode Summary

Executive Summary: The conversation argues that morality is best understood as a psychologically and culturally developed system, not a simple split between innate nature and learned culture. Dahl contends that scientific research can explain why people hold moral views and why they disagree, but cannot by itself settle moral questions. The discussion covers moral development in children, trolley and Milgram-style experiments, moral foundations, tipping, cheating, democracy, and moral progress.

Main Topics: Morality as fixed versus fickle (Priority: 5/5): Dahl rejects the idea that one side of a moral dispute is obviously rational while the other is merely emotional or selfish. He argues that opposing moral views often arise from sincere reasoning, even when one side is wrong. Nature, nurture, and the impossibility of a clean split (Priority: 5/5): The transcript repeatedly emphasizes that human morality cannot be cleanly divided into innate versus cultural components because development is continuous and genes only operate through environment and experience. Moral development in children and infants (Priority: 5/5): The discussion reviews infant studies, toddler moral growth, and parent-child socialization. Dahl says early preferences are not yet full moral judgments and that children develop moral understanding through interaction, not automatic programming. Moral dilemmas, trolley problems, and artificial experiments (Priority: 4/5): The speakers debate whether classic lab dilemmas and obedience studies capture real morality. Dahl argues they reveal useful patterns but oversimplify the rich, reasoned principles people use in real life. Political, religious, and factual disagreement (Priority: 5/5): Many moral conflicts are partly factual disputes or clashes over definitions, especially in abortion, trans rights, national sovereignty, and religion. Dahl stresses that science can clarify facts, but not settle value conflicts. Moral progress and changing social norms (Priority: 4/5): The conversation treats reduced war, expanded rights, and democracy as genuine moral progress, while also noting that some gains are reversible and that progress depends on historical and factual understanding. Cheating, lying, and context-sensitive morality (Priority: 4/5): The speakers discuss how people often justify lying, cheating, or tipping based on perceived fairness, social norms, or systemic pressure, rather than simple selfishness.

Key Arguments: Moral disagreement is often misread as a clash between rational truth and irrational emotion; in many cases, both sides reason from genuine moral concerns. Science can explain how people come to moral views and what empirical facts matter, but it cannot by itself determine what is right or wrong. There is no clean empirical boundary between what is innate/natural and what is cultural; human morality emerges from co-action among genes, development, and social environment. Infant preference studies show early social preferences, but these are not equivalent to adult moral judgments about categorical right and wrong. Many disputes that appear moral are partly factual or definitional, such as climate change, trans rights, and sovereignty claims. Moral systems are plural and often conflicting; people balance care, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity, rights, and other concerns rather than reducing everything to one principle. Historical moral progress is real, especially when grounded in better understanding of human equality and fewer wars, but some gains can still reverse. Parenting and social participation shape moral development, especially when children are allowed to help, negotiate, and see how their actions affect others. Cheating and lying often reflect perceived unfairness, desperation, or systemic corruption rather than pure moral collapse. Understanding the other side more accurately should reduce demonization and improve moral judgment, even when disagreement remains.

Data Points: Infant age in moral-preference research: 3, 5, 7, and 9 months - Dahl discusses studies of infant preferences for helpful versus harmful agents. Moral development milestone: Third year of life - He says categorical third-party moral judgment emerges around age 2-3. Children's age in hand-back helping studies: 14 months - Referenced work showing infants hand back out-of-reach objects. Evolutionary separation: 35 million years - Used to describe the gap between capuchin monkeys and humans. Family example age: 20 months - Dahl mentions his daughter when discussing toddler development and chores. Marshmallow test delay: 15 minutes - Used as an example of delay of gratification and context dependence. Moral foundations count: 5 - Care, fairness, loyalty, purity, and authority. Typical moral foundations survey finding: Liberals score higher on care and fairness; conservatives score about equally across all five - Summary of the original Moral Foundations Theory findings. Academic cheating prevalence: Most students cheat at least once - Mentioned as a research-based generalization during the cheating discussion. Approximate group differences in moral views: Tiny average differences; within-group variability is much larger - Dahl argues race/gender/religion differences in capability are small relative to within-group differences.

Pivotal Quotes: "there could be an objective right answer about it ... and at the same time, the people who take another view ... could have sound reasons for holding their view" — Auden Dahl: On abortion and why disagreement does not imply selfishness or irrationality "we have a cultural nature" — Barbara Rogoff (quoted by Auden Dahl): On the impossibility of separating nature from culture in moral development "the role of science here ... is to inform us about a moral disagreement" — Auden Dahl: On the boundary between empirical facts and moral judgment

Implications: Listeners should expect morality to remain plural, contextual, and contested. Better science can reduce caricatures and polarization, but moral choices will still require judgment, compromise, and awareness of competing rights and values.

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